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Nigerian scam, also known as advance fee fraud or 419 scam, is a prevalent
form of online fraudulent activity that causes financial loss to individuals and busi-
nesses. Nigerian scam has evolved from simple non-targeted email messages to
more sophisticated scams targeted at users of classifieds, dating and other websites.
Even though such scams are observed and reported by users frequently, the com-
munity’s understanding of Nigerian scams is limited since the scammers operate
“underground”.
To better understand the underground Nigerian scam ecosystem and seek ef-
fective methods to deter Nigerian scam and cybercrime in general, we conduct a
series of active and passive measurement studies. Relying upon the analysis and
insight gained from the measurement studies, we make four contributions: (1) we
analyze the taxonomy of Nigerian scam and derive long-term trends in scams; (2)
we provide an insight on Nigerian scam and cybercrime ecosystems and their un-
derground operation; (3) we propose a payment intervention as a potential deterrent
to cybercrime operation in general and evaluate its effectiveness; and (4) we offer
active and passive measurement tools and techniques that enable in-depth analysis
of cybercrime ecosystems and deterrence on them.
We first created and analyze a repository of more than two hundred thousand
user-reported scam emails, stretching from 2006 to 2014, from four major scam
reporting websites. We select ten most commonly observed scam categories and tag
2,000 scam emails randomly selected from our repository. Based upon the manually
tagged dataset, we train a machine learning classifier and cluster all scam emails in
the repository. From the clustering result, we find a strong and sustained upward
trend for targeted scams and downward trend for non-targeted scams.
We then focus on two types of targeted scams: sales scams and rental scams
targeted users on Craigslist. We built an automated scam data collection system
and gathered large-scale sales scam emails. Using the system we posted honey-
pot ads on Craigslist and conversed automatically with the scammers. Through
the email conversation, the system obtained additional confirmation of likely scam
activities and collected additional information such as IP addresses and shipping
addresses. Our analysis revealed that around 10 groups were responsible for nearly
half of the over 13,000 total scam attempts we received. These groups used IP ad-
dresses and shipping addresses in both Nigeria and the U.S. We also crawled rental
ads on Craigslist, identified rental scam ads amongst the large number of benign
ads and conversed with the potential scammers. Through in-depth analysis of the
rental scams, we found seven major scam campaigns employing various operations
and monetization methods. We also found that unlike sales scammers, most rental
scammers were in the U.S.
The large-scale scam data and in-depth analysis provide useful insights on how
to design effective deterrence techniques against cybercrime in general. We study
underground DDoS-for-hire services, also known as booters, and measure the effec-
tiveness of undermining a payment system of DDoS Services. Our analysis shows
that the payment intervention can have the desired effect of limiting cybercriminals’
ability and increasing the risk of accepting payments.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Nigerian scams, also commonly referred to as Advance fee fraud or 419 scams1,
is a prevalent form of online fraud that not only causes financial loss to individuals
and businesses alike [3], but also can bring emotional or psychological damage to
victim users [4]. An estimation of global losses to Nigerian scams in 2005 is more
than 3 billion dollars [5]. Total financial loss from all referred cases of Internet
scam in the U.S. was also increased from 17.8 million dollars in 2001 to 800 million
dollars in 2014 [2]. While not all Nigerian scams nowadays originate from Nigeria,
a significant proportion of them still do, and the name Nigerian scam is used to
broadly refer to a large class of online fraud. This scam was originally mostly non-
targeted and delivered via email spam. However, today there are more sophisticated
targeted versions of this scam that are directed at users of classifieds, jobs and dating
sites.
Despite the ubiquitous presence of online Nigerian scams, we currently lack a
solid understanding of the online Nigerian scam ecosystem and the different tech-
niques scammers use to deceive and profit off their victims. Many online websites,
such as Craigslist, filter out scam postings to protect its legitimate users. For exam-
1We use all three terms interchangeably in this thesis.
1
ple, Craigslist has many safeguards in place to prevent scam postings, such as re-
quiring phone number verification for a Craigslist account to prevent scammers from
registering large numbers of Craigslist accounts and posting fraudulent advertise-
ments, blocking suspicious IP addresses and accounts, and removing advertisements
containing suspicious content. While most efforts to mitigate this problem focus on
filtering suspicious posts or emails, this is only the visible part of a well honed set of
scams and infrastructure established to extract money from their marks. An end-
to-end understanding of a scam and its structural dependencies (message postings,
email accounts, location of scammers, support companies, automated tools and pay-
ment methods) is often a crucial first step towards identifying potential weakness
along the chain. In particular, this “understanding to deterrence” trajectory has
resulted in suggesting weak points for disrupting other domain-specific threats,such
as payment processing in the counterfeit software and pharmacy spam domain [6,7].
To better understand the underground Nigerian scam ecosystem and seek ef-
fective methods to deter Nigerian scam and cybercrime in general, we conduct a
series of active and passive measurement studies. Relying upon the analysis and
insight gained from the measurement studies, we make four contributions: (1) we
analyze the taxonomy of Nigerian scam and derive long-term trends in scams; (2)
we provide an insight on Nigerian scam and cybercrime ecosystems and their un-
derground operation; (3) we propose a payment intervention as a potential deterrent
to cybercrime operation in general and evaluate its effectiveness; and (4) we offer
active and passive measurement tools and techniques that enable in-depth analysis
of cybercrime ecosystems and deterrence on them.
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Scam taxonomy and trends. The first step toward better understanding of
Nigerian scams is to create and analyze a large-scale Nigerian scam email dataset.
We collected more than two hundred thousand user-reported scam emails over the
recent nine years, stretching from 2006 to 2014 from four major scam reporting
websites. Since there is no de facto standard of scam taxonomy, we built a list of
major scam categories frequently observed and reported from users. We select ten
most commonly observed scam categories along with seven additional subcategories,
and analyze the underlying monetization methodology of each scam category.
In order to build a ground-truth dataset for scam email categorization, we
manually tag 2,000 scam emails randomly selected from our repository. Based upon
the manually tagged dataset, we train a machine learning classifier and then cluster
all scam emails in the repository. From the clustering result, we find a strong and
sustained upward trend for targeted scams and downward trend for non-targeted
scams. We then look at individual trends for different types of scams, and the
analysis of our scam repository show a dramatic rise in Romance, Authority and
BEC/Sales scams while Money transfer, Lottery and Phishing scams are in decline.
Our finding clearly suggests that scammers are Nigerian scammers are evolving from
traditional spam-like scams to more sophisticated scams targeting at specific users.
Understanding targeted sales scam. [8] We focus on sales scam or fake pay-
ment scam2, a typical form of targeted scams, on Craigslist, one of the most popular
online market websites whose monthly visitors are over 60 million in the U.S. alone3.
2We use these terms interchangeably in this thesis.
3http://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet
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We present an in-depth measurement study of such scam activities. Through this
measurement study, we aim to better understand the underground economy of Nige-
rian scams, and seek effective intervention points. In particular, we seek to address
questions such as the following: “Where are scammers located?”, “How do scam fac-
tories operate?”, “How do scammers monetize their scam activities?” and “What
features can we use to distinguish a scam email from a legitimate email?”
In order to better understand sales scams on Craigslist, we posted magnetic
honeypot advertisements – designed to attract scammers but repel legitimate users.
We received and replied to scam emails resulting from our advertisements, and
analyzed the emails. For quantitative analysis of scams, we build an automated data
collection system which posts advertisements, collects scam emails and interacts with
scammers by sending out a response to the received scam emails. We also collect
IP addresses of scammers to explicitly confirm geolocation of the scammers. We
perform various analysis of the massively collected dataset to better understand
how scammers work. We also cluster observed scammers into groups based on a
few key factors such as email addresses, shipping address, phone number and email
payload.
Our analysis reveals that these types of Nigerian scams are highly prevalent
as our magnetic honeypot advertisements on average received 9.6 scam replies. The
most enlightening result of our analysis is that about 50% of the scam attempts
observed can be linked back to the top 10 groups. These groups are targeting adver-
tisements spread over many classes of goods and geographic regions of Craigslist. In
addition, our analysis reveals that many of the initial scam messages are automated
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and arrive from a large number of email address that are quickly abandoned. How-
ever, most of these initial messages contain a different reply-to address to a smaller
set of longer lived email accounts. We also find that 23% of the shipping addresses
are located in the United States, although most of the IP addresses and shipping
addresses are located in Nigeria. This indicates there are likely either accomplices
or reshipping operations being used. Our analysis of the content of the messages
shows certain occurrences of words such as, God, overseas military personnel, and
capital letters that might be used to help filter these messages.
From this analysis we find several potential intervention points. Our analysis
of the message content indicates that message filtering could be improved by looking
for combinations of these pattern such as a reply-to address that does not match the
sender’s address, usage of these uncommon phrases, and identification and blacklist-
ing of these more stable and long-lived secondary accounts. Also, shipping addresses
might be the starting point for law enforcement investigations. Along these same
lines the fact that only ten groups of scammers accounted for nearly half of the
scams we received indicates that it might be possible to target and disrupt these
groups, greatly reducing the prevalence of this scam.
Understanding rental scam. [9] We present a systematic empirical study of
the targeted rental scams ecosystem as viewed through the lens of the Craigslist
rental section. The initial challenge of this study is detecting rental scam posting
amongst the large number of benign rental listings.
In this chapter, we conduct the first systematic empirical study of the online
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rental scams ecosystem as viewed through the lens of the Craigslist rental section.
Our in-depth analysis of these rental scam campaigns allows us to address questions
geared at improving our understanding of the supporting infrastructure with the
goal of exploring alternate points to undermine this ecosystem, such as: “What
are the common underlying scams?”, “Where are these scammers located and what
tools do they use?”, “How effective are current defences?”, “What payment methods
do they use?”. We summarize our contributions and findings below.
By developing several effective detection techniques, we are able to identify sev-
eral major rental scam campaigns on Craigslist. In addition, we extend Scam- baiter
automated conversation engine to automatically contact suspected rental scammers,
which enabled us to understand what support infrastructure they used and how they
were monetizing their postings. In total we detected about 29K scam listings over
the 20 cities we monitored, within a period of 141 days.
We find a diverse set of methods utilized for monetizing the rental scam cam-
paigns we identified. These include attempts to trick people into paying for credit re-
ports and “bait-and-switch” rental listings. When we explored the payment method
used, five of the seven major scam campaigns identified used credit cards. Many
campaigns also depended on businesses registered in the USA to collect payments.
We also find that Craigslist’s filtering methods are currently removing less than half
of the rental scam ads we detected.
Our results highlight the fact that scammers are highly customizing their mon-
etization methods to the United States rental market. They also expose new scams
and infrastructure that were not encountered in previous studies [10,11]. This differ-
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ence highlights the need to understand a wider range of scam domain and suggests
potential bottlenecks for many rental scam monetizing strategies at the regulatory
and payment layers. For instance, United States regulatory agencies, such as the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could investigate these companies and levy fines
for their deceptive advertising practices. Another potential method of demonetizing
these companies might be to alert credit card holder associations, such as Visa or
MasterCard, to these merchants’ deceptive billing and refund policies.
Understanding and deterring DDoS service. [12] We undertake a large scale
active and passive measurement study of booter services to understand how they are
structured both technologically and economically with the focus of isolating poten-
tial weaknesses. We explore booters from three different angles including analysis of
leaked and scraped data, measurements of their attack infrastructure and a payment
intervention.
Our analysis of leaked and scraped data from three booters—Asylum Stresser,
Lizard Stresser and VDO 4—demonstrates that these services have attracted over
6,000 paid subscribers that have launched over 600,000 attacks. We also find that
the majority of booter customers prefer paying via PayPal and that Lizard Stresser,
which only accepted Bitcoin, had a minuscule 2% sign-up to paid subscriber con-
version rate compared to 15% for Asylum Stresser and 23% for VDO, which both
accepted PayPal. By analyzing attack traffic directed at our own servers we are able
4We assign each booter service a unique three letter code based on their domain name to avoid
unintentionally advertising their services. The two exceptions are Asylum Stresser, which ceased
operation before our study and Lizard Stresser, which has already been highly publicized.
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to characterize the set of amplifiers they use to direct large amounts of traffic at
their victims. In order to measure the resilience of their payment infrastructure, we
conduct a payment intervention in collaboration with PayPal and the FBI. Our eval-
uation of the effectiveness of this approach suggests that it is a promising method
for reducing the subscriber base of booters.
1.1 Outline
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents
a taxonomy of Nigerian scams and its trends over the last nine years. In chapter 3, we
describe a quantitative measurement study of sales scams on Craigslist. We provide
an insight into the underground ecosystem of Nigerian scam business on Craigslist,
and discuss potential intervention points. In chapter 4, we present another empirical
measurement study of rental scams on Craigslist. In chapter 5, we show a study
of DDoS-for-hire service, another form of cybercrime, and present an experimental
results of a large-scale payment intervention in collaboration with PayPal.
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Chapter 2: Trends In Nigerian Scams
2.1 Overview
This chapter focuses on taxonomy of scam emails collected from various sources
and derive a long-term trend in scam emails. We first collect a large-scale scam
emails and then analyze what kind of scams are there, what their structures are, how
they are related. Based upon the taxonomy analysis, we build a machine learning
classifier and cluster the scam emails into major scam categories. Then we further
analyze and derive different trends from each scam category. Our analysis show a
clear trend that spam-like non-targeted scams are decreasing while targeted scams
with specific victims are getting more prevalent over the last 10 years. We discuss
that our analysis can be used to provide the predictions of future scam developments
based on historical trends and insight gained through the analysis.
2.2 Data collection
In order to analyze the trends in scams, we collect extensive scam emails and
its statistics from several sources including scam reporting sites, spam email dataset
and government report on internet crimes.
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Source URL Start date End date
# Scam
emails
Anti Fraud International antifraudintl.org 02/2007 12/2014 57,338
Scam Warners scamwarners.com 07/2008 12/2014 54,352
Scamdex scamdex.com 01/2006 12/2014 75,943
419baiter 419baiter.com 06/2008 02/2012 31,847
Total 219,480
Table 2.1: Dataset summary. Summary of scam email dataset between 2006 and 2014.
2.2.1 Scam reporting sites
The basis of our analysis of scam trends relies upon a large-scale scam email
dataset. We first focus on scam reporting sites where many anonymous users post
scam emails that they received. Amongst many scam reporting sites, we select 4
major ones with relatively large scam email database, more than 30K scam emails
in each site. We crawl scam emails reported between 2006 and 2014, that is, more
than 10K scam emails each year. Overall we collect about 220K scam emails over 4
scam reporting sites. Table 2.1 represents the summary of our scam email dataset.
2.2.2 FBI/IC3 annual report
Even though we are able to collect many number of scam emails, it is still
unclear that what kind of scams are more threatening to people, that is, generating
larger number of victims and financial losses. In this context, we reference FBI/IC3
annual reports [2] to see what kind of internet frauds are frequently reported to law
enforcement and regulatory agencies, and how much financial losses they result in.
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2.3 Taxonomy of scam emails
Since there is no de facto standard of scam categorization, we first need to
build major scam categories frequently reported from users. There exist a few re-
ports [2, 13] regarding a taxonomy of online fraud. National Fraud Authority [14]
also releases annual reports on offline fraud activities. Also scam reporting sites
have their own scam categorization rules. However we cannot apply existing cat-
egorization directly to our scam dataset primarily because they do not cover all
scam categories we find from our dataset. Also, each report and scam reporting site
use different scam categories. For example, anti fraud international has 20 scam
categories while 419baiter and scammed.by do not categorize scam emails at all.
Hence we build our own scam categorization as described in Table 2.2. Through the
rigid investigation of the collected scam emails and literature survey, we find 9 scam
categories (14 if counting subcategories) commonly used or frequently reported to
the scam reporting sites. We categorize scam emails based on 1) whom scammers
are pretending to be and 2) how scammers try to persuade their victims. Table 2.2
summarize the list of scam categories and brief description of each scam category.
We use our own scam categorization throughout this chapter.
2.3.1 Non-targeted scams
The topmost categorization rule is whether a scam emails is either non-targeted,
targeted or both. Non-targeted scam is a traditional and typical form of email fraud
















Loan 55 (2.75%) 6,428 (2.95%)

















Phishing 71 (3.55%) 9,368 (4.30%)
Targeted
Business 54 (2.70%) 5,295 (2.43%)
Rental 43 (2.15%) 7,228 (3.32%)
Romance 203 (10.15%) 20,960 (9.63%)
Both
Employment 71 (3.55%) 10,191 (4.68%)
Sales 11 (0.55%) -
Etc.
Others 165 (8.25%)
22,192 (10.19%)Invalid emails 113 (5.65%)
Total 278 (13.90%)
Total 2000 217,745
Table 2.2: Scam email taxonomy. 9 most prevalent scam categories and their
estimated fractions based on manual tagging and Support Vector Machine (SVM) [1]
classifier.
scam emails as possible to anonymous users, just like spam.
Authority scams. In authority scams, scammers pretend to be employees at
banks (bank scams), government agencies or international organizations (govern-
ment/organization scams). The scammers abusively use the names of renowned
organizations (e.g., Bank of Africa, FBI and IMF) to gain trust of victims. In bank
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scams, scammers offers a pre-loaded ATM cards or charity fund to victims, and re-
quire a fee in advance. Similarly scammers in government/organization scams notify
their victims that they are able to receive a charity fund and require a fee for the
process. Sometimes this type of scams involve threatening (e.g., black money in vic-
tim’s account) or malware propagation (e.g., attachment containing virus or worm).
Authority scam emails mostly look like official emails from the organizations, and
the whole processes explained in the emails also seem official work.
Loan scams. Scammers in loan scams offer loans to victims usually at an attrac-
tive interest rate. But the scammers ask an upfront fees for further loan service
processing. This kind of scam emails do not look professional and especially the
first emails usually contain couple of short sentences.
Lottery scams. Lottery scams bring an unexpected but happy news to a victim
that his email address has been put into a lottery and wins the prize! Scammers
usually require a fee in advance for transferring a huge amount of prize. This is one
of most typical and prevalent form of un-targeted scams.
Money transfer scams. Scammers in money transfer scams usually have funds
in African countries and want to transfer the funds to victims countries for several
purposes. Scammers in Charity/dying person scams usually have inheritance of
several million in US dollar and ask victims to help in moving the fund for charity
business in victims’ countries. Business/commodity scammers explain that they are
looking for a business partner who will help them invest their money or sell their
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commodity in victims’ countries. Next of kin scam is a typical and one of the most
prevalent form of fraud. Scammers in this scam categories are usually bankers or
attorneys who have access to abandoned accounts of their client who have passed
away without any wills or inheritors. They propose to put victim’s name as a next of
kin and inherit the money. Widow/orphan/refugee scammers are usually in unstable
countries with internal wars or dictators. They have inheritance from their parents
or husbands who have passed away recently, and want to transfer their money out of
their countries for the safety. Conversation subcategory includes scam emails in the
middle of conversation between scammer and victim, so it is hard to classify those
emails into a specific subcategory. In all cases, victims are promised to get a certain
percentage of the transferred funds in the return of helping the scammers, but the
victims are also required to pay an upfront fee for the money transfer process.
2.3.2 Targeted scams
In targeted scams, scammers may have a certain context of their potential
victims, e.g., the fact that the victim is looking for an apartment on Craigslist or is
selling an old iPhone on eBay. Since the scammers are able to exploit this context
of the victims, conversations in targeted scams are more natural and plausible.
Business email compromise scams. Business email compromise (BEC) scams
generally target specific companies related with supplies from foreign businesses.
In this scam category, scammers can be sellers who present product catalogs with
attractive price tags, and sometimes they can be buyers who request product lists
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from victim businesses. Since scammers are “foreign” businesses, payments are usu-
ally done via wire transfer or other electronic payments. Seller scammers prefer
these payment methods since those are easy to perform but hard to reverse. Like-
wise buyer scammers also prefer those since it is relatively easy to fabricate “fake”
payment notification to victims.
Rental scams. Rental scams may target users who post listing on classified ad-
vertisements websites to look for a rent, or also may post “fake” rental listing by
themselves to lure the victims. A common methodology of those scammers is to
attract victims with low-priced rents and then ask an upfront fee for the rent of first
month and security deposit. The scammers often copy an actual rent listing and
repost that with much lower rent price, and may ask the victims to look around
the house first. But usually a victim is not allowed to enter the house since the
home owner (scammer) is on travel with good purpose (e.g., mission trip to African
countries). Hence it may be hard for the victim to figure out if the rent list is legit
or not. We study more details of rental scams in Chapter 4.
Romance scams. Romance scams is little bit different from other types of scams
in that scammers have to build a relationship with a victim for relatively long time.
Once the scammer build a relationship with the victim successfully, then he may ask
money for various reasons, e.g., to purchase a flight ticket. Since the initial phase
of romance scam is just “normal” conversation, it is relatively hard to determine
whether it is scam.
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2.3.3 Both non-targeted and targeted scams
Certain types of scams can be categories into both non-targeted and targeted
scams.
Employment scams. Employment scams present in various forms. One typical
form of employment scams starts with a decent job offer from a company located
out of victim’s home country. Then the victim is usually required to an upfront fee
for documentation process, e.g., visa application. Employment scams can be both
non-targeted and targeted: non-targeted employment scams are sent to unspecified
emails addresses just as in spams, and targeted employment scams starts from job
listing on classified advertisements websites.
Phishing scams. In general, goal of Phishing scams is either to steal victim’s
private credentials (e.g., password or SSN) or to make victim install malware by
spoofing famous companies that hold victim’s money or account information (e.g.,
banks or PayPal). The key trick in this type of scams is links embedded inside
emails which lead the victim to scammer’s fabricated websites.
Sales scams. In sales scams, scammers can be either seller or buyer: seller scam-
mer posts a fraudulent ad on classified advertisements websites, and buyer scammer
responds to victim’s legit ad and makes a fake payment, e.g., fake PayPal payment
notification or bogus check. One typical example of sales scams is used car sales
scam where a scammer post a fraudulent ad selling a non-existing car on classified
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advertisements websites. We investigate deep into sales scams in Chapter 3.
2.4 Scam classification
Since each scam reporting site uses different scam categories, we first try to
cluster the scam email dataset we’ve collected from various sources based on a unified
scam categories described in Chapter 2.3.
The first step of scam classification is to establish the ground truth for the
classification. We manually inspected 2000 scam email samples selected randomly
from our dataset and tagged them based on the scam categories listed in Table 2.2. 1
In some cases, it is not clear to classify a scam email into a scam category due to
the similarity between two or more scam categories. For example, a scammer may
pretend to be a banker and asks a help from a victim in transferring abandoned
money of his client who passed away a few years ago. This scam email can be
classified as Authority - Bank scam if we focus on the email sender or Money transfer
- Next of kin scam if we focus on the content of the email. We set a major principle
to resolve this kind of ambiguity— putting the highest priority on email contents.
Although the example email was sent from a banker, the email is not pretended to
be an official email from a bank and the email contents is more about Money transfer
scam, we classified it as Money transfer scam. If an ambiguity is still not resolved,
we then classify the scam emails into Others category. The result of manual tagging
is also shown in Table 2.2. We find that about 41% of all scam email samples are
money transfer scams that is known to be a traditional and typical form of email
1Note that the manual tagging was done by a single person in our research team.
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scams. The second and third largest fractions are lottery scams and romance scams
which account for about 11% and 10% of scam email samples relatively. Both scam
categories are also well-known typical types of email scams.
We then implement SVM [15] classifier using Python scikit-learn library [16]
and train the classifier using 2000 manually tagged email samples. We eliminate
basic English stop words and other non-alphabetical characters. But we do not
delete numbers and a special character “$” since those are meaningful in scam emails
since they represent a certain amount of money. Hence we replace numbers and a
special character $ with “number term” and “dollar term” respectively. We then
extract TF-IDF [17] features from each sample and randomly select 80% of samples
as train set and 20% as test set. Then our SVM classifier is trained using the train set
and its performance is evaluated using the test set. We repeated the SVM classifier
evaluation 10 times using different train and test sets, and the evaluation results
are presented in terms of precision/recall and ROC curve as shown in Figure 2.1.
For the ease of classification, we do not use subcategory and classify scam emails
to category level only. We also merge business email compromise scams and sales
scams due to the similarity of terms used in email contents. Although the email
contents of BEC scams and sales scams are easily distinguished by human, SVM
classifier with TF-IDF features failed in classifying those scam emails.
Figure 2.1 shows the performance of the SVM classifier in terms of preci-
sion/recall and ROC curve. In Figure 2.1(a), the SVM classifier shows higher than
90% precision with at least 60% recall for all scam categories. If Etc and BEC scam
categories are excluded, the SVM classifier shows over 95% precision with at least
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80% recall for the rest scam categories. According to the receiver operating char-
acteristic curve in Figure 2.1(b), the SVM classifier shows over 90% true positive
rate with lower than 5% false positive rate except Etc scam category. Since Etc
scam category covers various scam types that account for small portions, and this
scam category is not our interest. Although our SVM classifier may not show the
minimal false positives and false negatives, it can be seen that the SVM classifier
has reasonably good enough performance to show an overall trends in scams.
We then classify the rest scam email dataset using the SVM classifier already
trained as described above. The overall classification result is presented in Table 2.2.
Money transfer scam accounts for the largest portion of over scam emails in both
results, 41% in manual tagging and 43% in SVM classification. Within Money
transfer scam category, a typical Nigerian scam called Next of kin forms 18%, and
Widow, orphan, refugee scams make up about 6% of all scam emails. The second
largest scam category except Etc is Lottery scam in both results, accounting for
about 11% in both manual tagging and SVM classification results. Besides those
scam categories, the similarity in all scam categories between manual tagging and
SVM classification results is clearly shown in Table 2.2. This observation strongly
supports the preciseness and effectiveness of our SVM classifier.
2.5 Scam trends
In this chapter, we derive long-term trends in scams based upon the classifi-
cation results described in Chapter 2.4 and FBI/IC3 annual reports. We focus on
19
























































Figure 2.1: Precision/recall and receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve
of SVM classifier. Every scam category except “Etc” show over 95 % precision with
over 60% recall and 90% false positive rate with under 5% false positive rate. Therefore
it can be seen that the SVM classifier has good enough performance to show an overall
trends in scam trends. All performance metrics were measured using 2000 samples divided
randomly into 80% train set and 20% test set. Repeated 10 times.
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the scam email dataset between the year of 2006 and 2014, and analyze the trends
over the long term of nine years.
Caveat. Since our analysis relies upon the self-reported scam email dataset, the
numbers and proportions of different scam categories may not represent the actual
incidence of scams. Certain types of scam emails may be filtered out more frequently
by email service providers and not delivered to users. In addition, people may not
report specific type of scam emails since it is harder to recognize that those emails
are scams. It is also reasonable to assume that self-reported scam email dataset
may have a bias toward easily recognizable and observable scam emails. However,
it is still meaningful to analyze the dataset since it would show the trends in scam
emails that are actually perceived by people. We also tried to minimize possible
biases by collecting scam emails from multiple sources.
2.5.1 Overall trends in scams
Annual number of scam complaints reported to FBI/IC3 is presented in Fig-
ure 2.2. In 2006, the number of complaints was about 200,000 and has increased
up to 334,000 in 2009. Then the number of complaints has decreased slightly to
270,000 in 2014. Overall, the number of scam complaints reported to FBI/IC3 has
increased by 33% between 2006 and 2014.
Figure 2.3 shows the overall trends in terms of fraction of scam emails reported
in four scam reporting websites. Total number of scam emails reported has increased
by 23% each year, from 9,700 in 2006 up to 29,500 in 2014. Although the number
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Figure 2.2: Number of scam complaints reported to FBI/IC3. [2] Number of
scam complaints increases by 30% between 2006 and 2014.
of scam emails increased, we do not argue that changes in number of scam emails
reported each year reflect increase or decrease of actual number of scam emails, since
the activeness of each scam reporting website varies over time. Hence we analyze
the changes in relative fractions of scam emails which would reflects trends in scam
emails at certain degree. Later in this chapter, we focus on the fractions of each
scam category and analyze the long-term trends in scam emails.
2.5.2 Targeted vs Non-targeted scams
We first analyze the overall trends in scams in terms of “targeted” vs “non-
targeted” scams. We cluster scam emails in our dataset per Table 2.2 and derive
a long-term trends as shown in Figure 2.4. We exclude scam categories belong
to “Both targeted and non-targeted” scams to minimize confusions that may be
resulted from the ambiguous nature of the mixed scam category. Our analysis














































Figure 2.3: Fraction of scam emails reported to scam reporting websites.
targeted scams are in the opposite direction.
In 2006, non-targeted scams account for the majority of scam emails, about
96% of all scam emails while targeted scams has very limited percentage, about
0.7%. In 2014, on the other hand, the percentage of non-targeted scams decrease
drastically down to 31%, while targeted scams show steep increase up to 48%. This
result implies that scammers’ fraudulent methodology has improved, from simple
spam-like scams (e.g., lottery and money transfer scams) to more personalized and
plausible scams aided with context of specific victims (e.g., business email compro-
mise, romance and sales scams).
2.5.3 Scams on the rise
We first focus on which scam categories are getting increased over time. We
inspect the overall trends in scams shown in Figure 2.3 and find out three scam
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Figure 2.4: Targeted vs non-targeted scams. Targeted scams increases from 0.7% in
2006 up to 31% in 2014, but non-tageted scams decreases from 96% in 2006 down to 48%
in 2014.
categories that show explicit increase over the last 9 years: Authority, BEC/sales
and romance scams. We then compare our findings to FBI/IC3 annual reports [2]
to cross-check and justify our observation. Figure 2.5(a) and Table 2.3 show our
analysis of scams categories on the rise and corresponding results from FBI/IC3
annual reports, respectively.
Authority scam shows gradual increase from about 2% in 2006 up to about
13% in 2010 and 12% in 2014. Although it is hard to match our analysis to the
reports due to different scam categorizations, we are able to find from FBI/IC3
reports that FBI scam is included as one of the most frequently reported scams in
recent years, from 2009 to 2014. Even though FBI scam in FBI/IC3 reports does
not cover all kinds of authority scams, it still partially support our analysis.
We also observe a similar finding for romance scams. Romance scam shows
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rapid increase from less than 1% in 2006 up to 20% in 2012. According to FBI/IC3
reports, romance scam also has been prevalent from 2011 and included in the most
frequently reported scams.
BEC/sales scams also increased over nine years, from 0.6% in 2006 to 2.5% in
2014. Although neither BEC or sales scams was identified as one of the most fre-
quently reported scams in FBI/IC3 annual reports, BEC was considered an emerging
scam category recently. According to 2014 FBI/IC3 annual report, BEC scam was
reported in 2010 for the first time, and has evolved into more sophisticated and
various forms from 2013. Total financial loss resulted from BEC scam in 2014 was
estimated to be $226 million dollars.
2.5.4 Scams in the decline
From the analysis of scam trends, we are also able to find three scam categories
that are in decline: Lottery, money transfer and phishing scams. Figure 2.5(b) shows
the fraction of those three scam categories each year. Similarly, we try to find out
corresponding scam categories from FBI/IC3 reports and list relevant results in
Table 2.3.
Money transfer scam is the most frequently observed scam in our dataset, but
we are not able to find exact matches in FBI/IC3 reports. We find from FBI/IC3
reports the statistics of investment and Nigerian letter scams, which are directly
related to money transfer scams. Combining both investment and Nigerian letter




2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
FBI scams 7 7 7 3 3 3 3 3 3
Romance
scams
7 7 7 7 7 3 3 3 3
Real estate
scams
7 7 7 7 7 7 3 3 3




3 3 3 7 7 7 7 7 7
Table 2.3: Most frequently reported scams in FBI/IC3 annual reports [2]. FBI
and romance scams are more frequently reported in recent years. On the other hand,
identity theft, investment and Nigerian letter scams are less frequently reported in recent
years.
until 2008 and are not included afterwards. Hence it is reasonable to argue that
the statistics of FBI/IC3 reports support our observation that money transfer and
phishing scams are getting less frequent in recent years.
Phishing and Lottery scams, another typical non-targeted scams, are also de-
creased from 20% and 24% in 2006 to 3% for both in 2014. In FBI/IC3 reports, we
are able to find statistics of identity theft which is a close match to phishing scam.
As shown in Table 2.3, identity theft is one of the most frequently reported scams
until 2010 and is not included afterwards.
2.5.5 Analysis
Through the analysis of trends in scams based on our scam email dataset
and cross-checking FBI/IC3 reports, we find strong evidence suggesting that “tra-
ditional, un-targeted” scams such as lottery, money transfer and phishing scams
are in steep decline. On the other hand, more targeted and credible scams such as
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(a) Scams on the rise.
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(b) Scams in decline.
Figure 2.5: Scams on the rise and in the declines. Fraction of scam categories on
the rise and in decline.
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BEC/sales, romance, rental and authority scams are getting increased. Our study
on sales scams 3 reveals that scammers are organized in a few large groups and they
use semi automated tools to deal with many number of potential victims. Therefore
it is reasonable to assume that scammers are moving from spam-like non-targeted
scams towards more sophisticated targeted scams.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented a quantitative measurement study of Nigerian
scam emails. We built a large-scale scam email dataset and created a list of scam
categories commonly observed and reported by many users online. Then we clus-
tered the scam emails per the scam categories using a machine learning classifier
built based upon the manually tagged dataset. Our analysis of trends in scams
strongly implies that targeted scams are getting more prevalent while non-targeted
scams are in decline.
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Chapter 3: Sales Scams on Craigslist
3.1 Overview
Chapter 2 reveals that targeted scams are getting more prevalent while non-
targeted scams are decreasing. In this context, this chapter and next chapter focus
on two typical forms of targeted scams, sales scam and rental scam respectively.
In this chapter, we present the measurement and analysis results of sales scams
on Craigslist. Thorough this study, we aim to better understand the underground
economy of Nigerian scams, and seek effective intervention points. In particular, we
seek to address questions such as the followings: “Where are scammers located?”,
“How do scam factories operate?” and “What features can we use to distinguish a
scam email from a legitimate email?”.
In order to better understand Nigerian scams on Craigslist, we built an au-
tomated scam data collection system, Scambaiter. Using Scambaiter system, we
posted honeypot ads to attract scammers. Then we received and replied to scam
emails resulted from our honeypot ads. We perform various analyses of the mas-
sively collected dataset to better understand how scammers work. We also cluster
observed scammers into groups based on a few key factors such as email addresses,



















Figure 3.1: Automated scam data collection using magnetic honeypot ads.
(1, 2): The system posts “magnetic honeypot” ads which would attract scammers only;
(3): the scammers send scam emails in response to the magnetic honeypot ads;
(4): the system automatically engages in email conversations with scammers.
Fraud attempt: The conversation eventually leads to a fraud attempt, where the scam-
mer sends a fake PayPal notification or fake check, and urges the victim to send the goods
to the scammer-indicated mailing address.
3.2 Data Collection Methodology
We have built an automated data collection system that collects scam data on
Craigslist as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Our data collection methodology is explained
below.
3.2.1 Magnetic honeypot posts.
Our data collection focused on selling a variety of goods on Craigslist.
Our idea is to create magnetic honeypot advertisements that would selectively
attract scammers but not legitimate users. To do this, we post unattractive adver-
tisements, e.g., selling a used iPad at a price higher than new. More specifically, we
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choose goods among a list of popular items on Amazon to make sure that the goods
we are selling can be easily bought from Amazon or anywhere else. The selling price
is set to be a little bit higher than the price of new product found on Amazon. Any
sensible real user would conceivably not reply to such posts. However, scammers
would — they might be using bots to crawl Craigslist or automate the response
process, or might not carefully check the contents of each post due to lack of labor.
3.2.2 Automated communication with scammers.
We have built an automated conversation engine that performs linguistic anal-
ysis of incoming emails from scammers, and automatically engages in multiple
rounds of communication with scammers. The engine periodically checks inboxes of
email accounts used for Craigslist accounts and reads in all unread emails. Then it
classifies the emails to identify valid scam emails. Our automated engine replies to
a subset of the scam emails we receive — specifically, emails with a subject line that
replies directly to the subject of our post. Henceforth, our automated engine ex-
changes multiple rounds of emails with the scammer, leading to the fraud attempt,
e.g., fake PayPal notifications or fake checks.
The conversation engine is designed to generate 192 kinds of reply emails based
on 13 pre-defined keywords. (e.g., sale, price and condition) observed frequently
during the preliminary experiment conducted manually. The pre-defined keywords
are divided into four groups and the conversation engine generates a corresponding
sentence per each keyword group. Hence, the conversation engine creates up to four
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Keywords Example sentence
sale Yes, it’s still on sale.
available Yes, the product is still available.
still I still have it for sale.
price The price is < price >.
firm The firm price is < price >.
final The final price is < price >.
condition,
shape, detail
The condition is almost perfect since it was not used fre-
quently.
why I’m selling this just because it’s not in use.
reason I’m trying to sell it since I got a similar one correctly.
paypal
Sounds great. My paypal account is < account >. Please
let me know when the payment is done.
check I’m sorry but could you pay the money via paypal please?
Table 3.1: Pre-defined keywords and example sentence generated from the
keywords. Corresponding sentences are changed periodically during the experiment.
Keywords “paypal” and “check” are checked only for second and later replies.
sentences excluding greeting and enclosure, and if it failed in finding any keyword
from a scammer’s email, it does not send out a reply email. Beside, specific keywords
such as “paypal” and “check” are checked only for generating second or later replies,
since usually those terms are not used in scammers’ first response. List of keywords
and example sentences are listed in Table 3.1.
We also inspected 200 randomly selected scammer emails to check if we re-
ceived emails from legitimated users. We expected that any legitimate users would
mention unreasonably high price of the honeypot ads, or at least they would try to
negotiate the price. Through the manual inspection, we found no emails explicitly
sent from legitimate users. In many cases, however, the contents of emails are too
short (e.g., only one sentence), so it is not clear to identify if an email is from scam-
mer or not. Those emails were considered scam emails based on the nature of our
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honeypot ads.
The most common type of fraud we observe is a fake PayPal notification stating
that funds have arrived at the victim’s PayPal account, followed by requests for the
victim to send the product to the scammer’s mailing address. A typical example
of email conversation is posted in Figure 3.2, and more examples are posted in
Appendix A.1.
3.2.3 IP address collection.
The IP address of an email sender provides insightful information, such as
scammers’ geolocation. However, collecting IP addresses from email headers is not
always feasible when the emails are relayed by the site (e.g., Craigslist), or if the
webmail provider does not include source IP address in email headers (e.g., Gmail).
To collect IP addresses of scammers, our automated conversation engine embeds
an external image link into emails generated in response to a received scam email.
Since the embedded link leads to a web server under our control, we can collect
IP addresses of anyone who accesses image files we’ve embedded. The embedded
link is unique to the corresponding advertisement so that we can later analyze the
collected IP addresses based on factors such as city, product category and price.
3.2.4 Ethics
Since our experiment ultimately deals with human subjects, we put several
controls in place to manage any harm to the participants. In addition, we went
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iPhone 5 64GB (WashingtonDC)
[from: cathy caraballo <cathycaraballo93@gmail.com>]
Still available for sell??
[Our response]
Yes, the product is still available. Please let me know if you need more
information.
[from: cathy caraballo <cathycaraballo93@gmail.com>]
Thanks for getting back to me [words omitted] l will give you $680 for the
item in order to out bid other buyer and $60 for shipping via a register mail
down to my Son,kindly get back to me with your PayPal email account so l can
proceed now with your payment and if you don’t have an account with PayPal,
its pretty easy, safe and secured to open one. Just log on to WWW.PayPal.com
[words omitted]
Thanks and God Bless.
[Our response]
Sounds great. My paypal account is sarkadejan@gmail.com. Thanks!
[from: cathy caraballo <cathycaraballo93@gmail.com>]
Hello Friend.just want you to know that your payment has been made paypal just
mailed me now so check your inbox or spam and your money has been deducted
from my account pending to your account.. [words omitted] tracking number and





Dear Sarkadejan@gmail.com, You’ve received an instant payment of $770.00 USD
from Cathy Caraballo93, [words and images omitted]
Figure 3.2: Example 419 scam thread. The first scam response usually has one or
couple of simple sentences showing scammer’s interest in goods posted by the victim. The
second scam response contains a fraud attempt through fake PayPal or bogus check. The
scammer’s offer is usually attractive since their offer price is higher than then victim’s list
price. Finally, the third and later scam responses urge the victim to send the goods to
the designated mailing address.
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through the process of getting our experiment approved by our institution’s human
subjects review process. During the experiment, we collected scam emails by posting
honey pot advertisements which may attract responses from legitimate users as
well as scammers. Even though our honey pot advertisements are designed to be
“unattractive” such that legitimate users would not be interested in replying, it is
still possible that our experiment might receive responses from legitimate users that
send an actual payment to buy a product that we have posted on Craigslist. In order
to prevent this unintentional “victimization”, we consistently check if there were any
actual payments made by legitimate Craigslist users. If a payment was made by a
legitimate user, the victim would be provided with pertinent information about our
experiment, and the item would be shipped to them or the refund procedure would
be initiated immediately. In addition, any messages from this user would be purged
from our collected data. Note that fortunately, we found no payment made by any
legitimate users during the entire experiment.
Another issue concerns how we use the collected data that might contain
private information about scammers. Throughout the experiment, we gathered
messages that contain information such as shipping addresses and phone numbers
which could potentially be used to identify scammers. We limit the use of raw data
to email addresses, IPs, and text from messages that will not clearly identify the
actual identity of the scammer. All other information is only included in aggregate
to avoid revealing the identity of any scammers.














Emails received 19, 204
Emails sent 9, 902
Email threads
First scammer responses received 13,215
First replies sent 8, 048
Second scam-related response received 1,626
Fake PayPal payment emails (not threads) 751
Bogus check payment threads 885
Table 3.2: Summary of experimental result
ments 1. Specifically, each of our accounts only posted in a single location and were
restricted to a posting rate of once every 48 hours.
3.3 Dataset
Table 3.2 presents a summary of the dataset we collected using the method-
ology described in Section 3.2. More details of each part of the table are explained
below.
3.3.1 Overview and terminology.
Our 419 scam data collection spans a duration of roughly three months, from
4/15/2013 to 7/19/2013. We selected 20 locations including 10 large and 10 small
cities/areas from a list provided by Craigslist. The large cities include San Francisco,
1http://www.craigslist.org/about/terms.of.use
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Seattle, New York, Boston, LA, San Diego, Portland, Washington DC, Chicago and
Denver and small cities/areas include Twin Tiers, Cumberland Valley, Meadville,
Susanville, Siskiyou, Hanford-Corcoran, Santa Maria, Winchester, Southwest and
Eastern Colorado.
We selected four product categories including cell phone, computer, jewelry
and auto parts, which are used by many Craigslist users and therefore, many adver-
tisements are posted daily posted as usual. As mentioned in Section 3.2.4, we posted
our ads at very low rates, so that they account for only an unnoticeable fraction of
the total traffic volume in each city on Craigslist. Specifically, we posted at most
one advertisement per category per city every 48 hours, which makes at most 80
advertisements per 48 hours in total. The price of products used in the experiments
ranged from $80 to $7, 000.
Table 3.3 shows the terminology that we use to refer to honeypot ads and
received emails throughout this thesis.
Effective ads
Magnetic honeypot ads that are not flagged by
Craigslist until the expiration (1 week)
Email thread Several emails in the same conversation
First response received
The first email sent by the scammer to us after seeing
our Craigslist ads.




The scammer’s response to our first reply; our reply
to that in turn
Table 3.3: Terminology
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3.3.2 Magnetic Honeypot Advertisements.
During the experiment, we posted 1, 376 magnetic honeypot advertisements
over 20 large and small cities in the U.S. Among the whole advertisements posted,
747 advertisements were flagged by Craigslist, leaving 629 effective advertisements.
42 emails accounts (Craigslist accounts) were used during the experiment. We de-
signed our system to post magnetic honeypot advertisements evenly distributed
over posting time and product category to minimize possible biases in the collected
dataset. Figure 3.3 illustrates distribution of effective advertisements over time of
day. In this figure, the slight unevenness in distribution (over different times of the
day and product category) partly stems from Craigslist’s flagging policy.
The average number of effective ads posted per each hour is 26.2. (min/max/
median/standard dev = 20/38/26/4) The average number of effective ads posted
per product category is 157.3. (min/max/median/standard dev = 144/187/149/20)
It is believed that the degree of variation observed in both distribution would not
cause any significant bias in the collected dataset.
3.3.3 Collected emails and threads.
The total number of emails received during the experiment was 19, 204 and
the number of emails sent is 9, 902. Several emails in the same conversation are
together referred to as a thread.
Among the total of 19, 204 emails received in our data collection 15, 270 were
first responses. Among these first responses, our system determined that 13, 215 rep-
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of magnetic honeypot ads over ad posting time. The
ad posting engine posts magnetic honeypot ads every 48 hours or more in each city and
category.
resented scam-related activities based on subject, pre-defined keywords and sender
email addresses, whereas the remaining include spams and fake PayPal payment
emails and emails delivered from email service providers. As a result, our system
attracted 9.6 scam trials (first scam responses) per ad. We are not arguing in this
thesis that we attracted all kinds of scammers since we might have missed some
scammers who were too smart to take our honeypot ads. Even if our scam dataset
is somewhat biased, it would be still meaningful to collect and analyze a large-scale
scammer information to get a fundamental understanding of their operation.
From the 13, 215 scam-related first responses, our automated data collection
engine sent 8, 048 first replies. As mentioned in Section 3.2, presently we only send
replies to emails that directly reply to our posts. There are 9, 008 out of 13, 215 first
responses reply directly to our posts — by including the subject line that we used
for our ads. We did not send first replies for 960 out of 9, 008 valid first responses
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since our system failed in finding out pre-defined keywords necessary to generate
corresponding replies.
For 1, 626 of the threads, we received a second response from the scammer.
Finally, we received 751 fake PayPal payment notifications emails and 885 bogus
check fraud attempts. Note that we received multiple fake PayPal payment emails
for some threads, and it was not always possible to tie a PayPal notification back
to an email conversation thread, since for most fake PayPal notifications the source
email address is different from those used in the email conversation.
3.4 Analysis of scammers’ IP addresses
As described in 3.2, we collected IP addresses of scammers by embedding an
external link to a product image. We gathered IP addresses from web logs of the
server that hosts product image files.
3.4.1 IP geolocation.
In the experiment, we observed 965 IP addresses over 22 countries. The total
number of accesses to the image hosting server from those IP addresses were 7, 759,
and each IP address was observed 8 times on average. (min/max/median/standard
dev = 1/182/3/16.1) 16 out of 965 IP addresses were web crawlers such as MSN
search engines and excluded in our analysis. Figure 3.4 illustrates the IP geolocation
of scammers who have accessed the embedded image links more than once. The





























Figure 3.4: IP Geolocation of scammers. For 949 IP addresses observed, 51.1% is
are from Nigeria and 36.6% are from the U.S.
address.
Scammers’ IP addresses were observed from all over the world but most of them
were located in Nigeria and the U.S. In particular, 51.1% of collected IP addresses
were from Nigeria and 36.6% were from the U.S. Note that this figure is plotted
based on the number of unique IP addresses observed. It is also possible that some
scammers could be using proxies, so the IP geo-location does not reflect their true
location.
In Figure 3.5, the distribution of IP addresses over number of C class subnets
(255.255.255.0/24) and B class subnets (255.255.0.0/16) is illustrated. We observed
406 class C subnets in total, and 40 of them take about half of whole IP addresses.
Also, 10 out of 242 class B subnets account for about half of whole IP address.
The result shows that small portion of subnets take major number of IP addresses
observed, and it might imply the possibility of small number of scam factories dom-




























Class C subnet Class B subnet
Figure 3.5: Cumulative distribution of IP addresses over number of subnets.
The total number of class C subnets is 406 and class B subnet is 242. Half of IP addresses
observed belong to 40 class C subnets or 10 class B subnets.
3.4.2 IP blacklist.
We cross-checked the collected IP addresses with a publicly available black-
list, Project Honey Pot [18] containing IP addresses of user-reported spam and and
scam generators. The result is outlined in Table 3.4. In particular, Project Honey
Pot contains blacklisted IP addresses which were confirmed to be malicious; and
graylisted addresses, which were detected but have not been confirmed to be mali-
cious. From the IP addresses we collected, 41.1% are blacklisted by Project Honey
Pot. 14.2% of IP addresses are in graylisted but not blacklisted.
About 44.7% out of the 949 IP addresses we found have not been blacklisted or
graylisted by Project Honey Pot. Therefore, one contribution of our measurement
study is to provide data to supplement existing IP blacklists.
Table 3.5 shows the top 20 IP addresses by the number of access to the external
link embedded in our replies. All top 20 IP addresses are confirmed to be located
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IP addresses Percentage
Not in black/graylist 44.7%
Blacklisted 41.1%
Graylisted 14.2%





41.211.193.XXX Nigeria 298 -
41.203.67.XXX Nigeria 241 Yes
41.203.67.XXX Nigeria 204 Yes
41.203.67.XXX Nigeria 160 Yes
41.211.198.XXX Nigeria 93 -
41.206.15.XXX Nigeria 89 Yes
41.184.21.XXX Nigeria 89 Graylisted
41.206.15.XXX Nigeria 88 Yes
41.211.201.XXX Nigeria 85 -
41.206.15.XXX Nigeria 79 Yes
41.206.15.XXX Nigeria 77 Yes
41.220.68.XXX Nigeria 73 Yes
41.203.67.XXX Nigeria 71 Yes
41.206.15.XXX Nigeria 68 Yes
41.206.15.XXX Nigeria 64 Yes
41.206.15.XXX Nigeria 60 -
41.206.15.XXX Nigeria 58 Yes
41.206.15.XXX Nigeria 57 Yes
41.206.15.XXX Nigeria 56 Yes
41.206.15.XXX Nigeria 56 Yes
Table 3.5: Top 20 IP addresses by the number of times observed. All top 20 IP
addresses are from Nigeria. 11 of the 20 IPs (in bold) belong to the same class C subnet.
in Nigeria. More interestingly, 11 of them belong to the same class C subnet,
41.206.15.0/24, which strongly implies that they are part of the same scam factory.
We also found that 4 out of 19 IP addresses are not blacklisted yet.
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3.5 Analysis of scammers’ email accounts
3.5.1 Source, reply-to address discrepancy, and email account reuse.
Throughout the experiment, we collected 4, 433 email accounts used for first re-
sponses of 13, 215 scam threads, indicating average reuse counts of 3 per an email ac-
count. (min/max/median/standard dev = 1/101/1/5.5) The most frequently reused
email account appeared in 101 threads. Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of email
reuse counts. 2, 410 email accounts, that is, 54.4% of total email accounts observed,
were used in only one thread and about 10% were used in more than 6 threads.
The majority of these single use only email addresses were initial inquiries about
the product availability that never matriculated into further negotiations. However,
many others were supporting emails used in the furtherance of the scam such as fake
PayPal notifications, transportation agents, threats to contact the FBI (for when
the product was not shipped) and similar emails. Some examples are posted in
Appendix A.1.
We also observe that for 81.9% of the first responses received, the source
email address is not the same as the reply-to address, and for 19.4% of the second
responses received, the source email address is not the same as the reply-to address.
This source and reply-to address discrepancy is shown in Table 3.6. The percentage
of discrepancy was much higher, 97.6% for first responses, within the top 10 groups.
The operating procedures of top tier organizations must account for the increased








































Number of threads reused 
Figure 3.6: Distribution of email account reuse count. For total of 4,433 email
accounts, 221 are used for more than 10 threads, and one email account is used for 101
threads.
First responses 13,125




Second responses with different source
and reply-to addresses
316 (19.4%)
Table 3.6: Source and reply-to address discrepancy. Source address and reply-to
address are different in more than 80% of first responses, whereas the percentage is much
lower for 2nd responses.
why they are more apt to split source and reply-to accounts.
Figure 3.7 shows that the set of source email addresses observed is much larger
than the number of reply-to addresses observed. It is possible that the large pool
of source addresses are disposable, and potentially automated, accounts that can
be readily discarded and replaced as they are blacklisted. On the other hand the
second, smaller tier of addresses are for more manageable monitoring and generally
attempted to be kept “clean” for continued use over time. This intuition is supported
by Table 3.7. We found a case that a single reply-to address was mapped to 108








Figure 3.7: Number of email threads, source email addresses and reply-to email
addresses.






Table 3.7: Number of source addresses mapped to a single reply-to addresses.
than 10 source addresses.
3.5.2 Email service provider.
Table 3.8 shows the proportion of each email provider the scammer uses, in
comparison with the provider’s estimated world-wide market share as reported by
Geekwire [19]. We find that the top email provider used by scammers is Gmail,
which accounted for 65% of the scammer email accounts observed, followed by Mi-
crosoft (Hotmail and Live), which accounted for 10% of the scammer email accounts
observed. Interestingly, in terms of world-wide market share, Yahoo is placed first,
with a market share of 42.8% [19]. However, Yahoo only accounted for 3.5% of the
email addresses we observed.
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It is interesting to correlate this with underground market prices of bulk email
accounts. Many PVA (Phone Verified Account) sellers of black market sell Gmail
accounts for a price higher than other emails such as Yahoo or Microsoft. For
example, one PVA seller3 sells 1000 Gmail accounts for $90, 1000 Yahoo accounts
for $15, 1000 Hotmail accounts for $5 and 1000 AOL accounts for $50.
Despite the most expensive market price, scammers seem to prefer Gmail over
other email services. The reason for this might be the fact that Gmail is the only
email service provider who supports free IMAP/SMTP and also hides IP address of
email senders among top 4 email providers. IMAP/SMTP is imperatively necessary
for scammers, since they deal with massive amount of emails. Also, since scammers
are working underground, they might want to hide their IP addresses not to expose
themselves and possibly to avoid filtering by email service provider of the recipient.
Scammers’ aversion to Yahoo can also be clearly explained, since Yahoo charges
$20 for SMTP/IMAP services. Although Microsoft supports free POP3/SMTP,
those features were enabled recently in 2009. In this context, Gmail might be the
reasonable solution for scammers.
3.5.3 Sample bad email addresses.
We also observed interesting “clusters” of bad email addresses. For example,
the following email addresses we observed are close variants of each other:
This clearly shows that a scammer or a group of scammers create several email




















AOL 4.9% 11.9% Yes No $50
Yahoo 3.5% 42.8% Yes ($20) No $15
Others 16.6% − − − −
Table 3.8: Distribution of email service providers. Gmail is preferred by majority
number of scammers, despite the highest PVA(Phone Verified Account) price, possibly
since Gmail is the only webmail service provider which supports free IMAP/SMTP and




3.6 Shipping Addresses and Phone Numbers
3.6.1 Shipping Addresses.
153 distinct shipping addresses were identified throughout the study by threads
that progressed far enough so that shipment of the product was expected. As with
IP addresses discussed in 3.4, the majority, 70%, of the shipping addresses were
located in Nigeria with 23% and 7% located in the United States and other foreign
countries respectively (Table 3.8(a)). Some shipping addresses had multiple names,
assumed to be aliases, associated with them. In one circumstance, seven names
were associated with a single Nigerian address. For the classification of the threads
into groups, emails with the same shipping address were assessed as belonging to the
same group. Additionally, some addresses were in close proximity to each other. For
example, three different apartment numbers for the same street address in Nigeria
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were used as shipping addresses. In these circumstances, the threads were not
assessed as belonging to the same group since being neighbors did not definitively
indicate the occupants were part of the same organization.
3.6.2 Phone Numbers.
206 distinct phone numbers were identified during the study (Table 3.8(b)).
Most were given either as part of the initial inquiry or during the follow-on ne-
gotiation emails, with only a few numbers withheld until the end of the purchase
and then provided along with the shipping address. Diverging from the pattern
seen with IP addresses and shipping addresses, the majority of the phone numbers,
91%, are registered within the United States and relatively balanced, but slightly
in favor of, voice over internet protocol (VOIP) over cellular numbers. Of the 15
phone numbers identified as registered overseas, 12 were Nigerian, and all of these
were associated with completed scam attempts and aligned with distinct Nigerian
shipping addresses. Four phone numbers were either missing digits or area codes
and therefore could not be categorized.
3.7 Scam Patterns
We report interesting patterns observed, including the distribution of scams
received during various times of the day; response delay of the scammer; and what
factors affect the scammer’s response rate.
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(a) Shipping Addresses.




(b) Phone Numbers. Unknown locations
are due to missing digits or area codes.




Other Country Unknown 3
Unknown Unknown 4
Table 3.9: Shipping addresses and phone numbers.
3.7.1 When do scammers work?
The distribution of received time of first and second scam responses are illus-
trated in Figure 3.8. Figure 3.8(a) shows the distribution of posting time of effective
advertisements and the received time of first scam responses. During the experi-
ment, our automated data collection system posted advertisements evenly across the
whole time of day. After removing the ads flagged by Craigslist, however, the num-
ber of effective ads varies slightly across different times of the day. Average number
of effective advertisements at each hour is 26.2 (min/max/median/standard dev =
20/38/26/4).
Figure 3.8(a) and Figure 3.8(b) show that both the first and second scammer
responses peak during 11AM to 6PM, and from 8PM to 10PM UTC (Coordinated
Universal Time), This corresponds to the time period between 12PM to 7PM WAT
(West Africa Time), which largely overlaps with working time in Nigeria. Moreover,
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the time period with the lowest scam responses is between 12AM and 6AM UTC,
and it corresponds to 1AM to 7AM WAT. In addition, our first replies sent also
peak during Nigeria’s work hours, because our automated engine polls the emails
every three hours and responds to the new emails. These observations support the
result discussed in Section 3.4 that the majority of the collected IP addresses are
from Nigeria.
3.7.2 How fast do scammers respond?
Figure 3.9 shows the distribution of scammers’ response time. Only 6.5% of
first scam emails were received within 6 hour and about 36% were received within
24 hours. The response time can be an indication of the level of automation of scam
factories. We will discuss scam process automation later in 3.8.
On the other hand, we can observe much faster response time for second scam
responses. 26.5% of second scam responses were received within an hour from the
first reply of ours, and about 90% were received within 24 hours. This is likely due to
the fact that our automated engine sends replies to scammers no later than 3 hours
from receipt of their scam email. Figure 3.8(b) shows our first replies peak during
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(b) First replies sent and second responses received across different times of the
day. Our automated response engine sends replies within 3 hours upon arrival
of a scammer email.
Figure 3.8: Received time of scam responses. The peak time of both first and second
responses (11AM to 6PM UTC) largely overlaps the business hours in Nigeria.
3.7.3 Do product category and price affect scammers’ response rate?
As shown in Figure 3.10, each of our ads attracted 2.2 to 19.8 scam trials,
depending on the category of the advertisement. The number of scam trials per
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Figure 3.9: Response time of scam emails. Only about 36% of first scam responses
were received within 24 hours from ad posting. However, about 60% and 90% of second
scam responses were received within 6 hours and 24 hours from our first replies, respec-
tively.
Jewelry and 5 for Computer.
An interesting pattern observed here is that scammers seem to prefer a specific
product category, Auto parts, over others. We first tested if the distribution of
number of scammers’ responses per ad in each product category follows normal
distribution using normaltest function in Python SciPy package [20]. This function
tests the null hypothesis that a given samples come from a normal distribution based
on DAgostino and Pearsons test [21,22] that combines skew and kurtosis to produce
an omnibus test of normality. P-values for each product category are presented in
table 3.10. All P-values are lower than 0.05, hence the distribution of number of
scammers’ responses per ad does not follow normal distribution.
Auto parts Cell phone Jewelry Computer
P-value 6.55e-11 4.28e-13 8.87e-17 1.42e-26
Table 3.10: P-values of normal distribution tests. P-values lower than 0.05 show
that the distribution does not follow normal distribution.
We then ran non-parametric KruskalWallis test in Python SciPy package for
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all product categories with the null hypothesis that the population median of all of
the groups are equal. P-value of the test was 6.85e-32, hence the null hypothesis is
rejected.
Lastly we ran pairwise KruskalWallis tests with the null hypothesis that the
population median of Auto parts and each of other product categories are equal.
P-values for each pairwise test is presented in table 3.11. P-values for all pairs
are lower than 0.05 showing that the population median of auto parts and other







P-value 4.89e-12 3.42e-18 1.08e-26
Table 3.11: P-values of pairwise KruskalWallis tests. P-values lower than 0.05 show
that the population median of given pair is not equal.
A series of tests described above show Auto parts ads attracted statistically
significantly more scammer responses than ads of other product categories. We are
not able to state an explicit reason for the higher number of scam trials per ad for
Auto part category. Reasoning for this observation would be left as a future work.
The number of advertisements posted by all Craigslist users is not a valid
factor since we observed almost similar number of advertisements over 4 product
categories used in our experiment. Also, price does not seem to be a valid factor
since we are not able to find out any consistent pattern in 3.10 in terms of product






































Figure 3.10: Number of first scam responses per effective ad. Each of Auto parts
ad attracted 17.6 first scam responses in average while each of computer ad attracted 5
first scam responses. For this plot, we used a subset of the scam threads which we were
able to link to an ad.
3.8 Level of Automation
One interesting question is whether the scam process is automated, and to
what extent is it automated.
By combining various clues, such as inter-arrival time for the same email ad-
dress and received email distribution across various times of the day, we can draw the
conclusion that the scam process is automated to some extent, but not completely
so. More details are provided in Table 3.12 and below.
3.8.1 Signs of automation.
We observed clear signs of automation, including duplicate or templated re-
sponses observed in all stages of the scam process, outcome of broken scripts in
subject lines, extremely short inter-arrival times for the same email address.
We now provide more explanation on the inter-arrival times for the same email
address. Table 3.13 shows some of the largest email bursts received. An email burst
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is a sequence of emails sent from the same email address within a very short time
interval (no more than 15 seconds between emails). Table 3.13 suggests that the
largest bursts observed consists roughly 8 to 15 emails, with a mean interarrival time
of 2.5 to 5 seconds. These bursts were not directed solely at Craigslist ads within
a single city. One burst sent 15 email messages to multiple ads across 3 different
cities. More interestingly, two of the largest bursts observed consist solely of second
replies.
We also observed many emails (including first response, second and later re-
sponses, as well as payment notifications) have exactly the same contents, or clearly
use the same template to generate the content (Figure A.9 in Appendix A.1). We
also observed outcomes of broken scripts in first responses received. These demon-
strate that the scammer are using some (semi-)automated tools to automate their
response process, and more interestingly, their tools sometimes broke and generated
email subject lines that are not human readable (Figure A.3 in Appendix A.1).
3.8.2 Signs of manual labor.
On the other hand, we also observe signs of manual labor. First, according to
Figure 3.8, scam responses peak during working hours in Nigeria, which accounted
for 50% of the IP addresses we observed in Figure 3.4. Second, we received second
and later scam responses containing curses — presumably the scammer was frus-
trated with us not shipping them the goods. Interestingly, we observed same curse
emails occurring multiple times (Figure A.5 in Appendix A.1). It is likely in this
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case that the angry scammer is copying and pasting the curse response. Also, in
the latter stage of our data collection, some curse emails were received as a second
response, before even reaching the payment stage — this could be a sign that the
scammer actually started to detect our automated data collection.
The overall analysis of scam automation is outlined in Table 3.12.
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short inter-arrival time of first re-
sponse
broken scripts in email subject
duplicate/templated email contents
received emails peak during
work hours
Both first and second re-
sponses are partially auto-
mated
Scammers may need to man-
ually run or attend to auto-
mated tools
Second and later scam
response
short inter-arrival time of second re-
sponse
duplicate/templated responses
scammers’ curse emails (Fig-
ure A.3 in Appendix A.1),





Wrong email address/name in
the notification
Table 3.12: Analysis of scam automation.
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# Emails in Burst Mean Interarrival Time # Cities
15 5.2 sec 3
11 4.5 sec 3
11 5.6 sec 4
8 5.5 sec 3
7 4.3 sec 7
6 3.7 sec * 6
5 2.4 sec * 5
Table 3.13: Example Interarrival Times for Burst Traffic from a Single Email
Address. All emails in the same burst have exactly the same content. (*: Second response
emails)
3.9 Classification
In order to discover how prevalently these scammers/organizations infected
Craigslist and determine the scope of their operations, we classified the email mes-
sages into groups based on similarities within their attributes.
3.9.1 Conservative Classification Strategy.
We first used a very conservative clustering strategy to classify scam activities
observed into scammer groups. Specifically, if two scam threads shared exactly the
same email addresses, shipping address, or phone numbers, they are grouped as
the same scammer group. Email addresses whose prefix were 90% identical were
individually reviewed along with other attributes such as email textual content and
IP addresses so series such as the biglanreXX@gmail.com addresses noted earlier were
also grouped together when multiple attributes showed similarities. In this way, we
are highly confident that two scam threads belong to the same scammer group when






















Total Groups: 1,234 
Top 10 groups: 47.9% 
 
793 groups have 1 thread 
























Total Groups: 1,172 
Top 10 groups: 56.8% 
 
778 groups have 1 thread 
(b) Aggressive Classification Strategy: IP ad-
dresses within the same class C subnet are
deemed the same group.

























Total Groups: 1,220 
Top 10 groups: 56.1% 
 
791 groups have 1 thread 
(c) Aggressive Classification Strategy: Email ad-
dresses 90% similarity are deemed the same
group.
Figure 3.11: Scammer Group by Number of Threads. Small number of groups
account for about half of scam threads.
3.9.2 Top 10 Groups.
Based on our very conservative classification strategy, we found that the top
10 groups accounted for 48% of all received scam threads (see Figure 3.11(a)).
Further analysis of the top 10 groups showed that they operate over (almost)
all cities where we posted ads (Table 3.14), and most of them throughout the entire
duration of our data collection (Table 3.15). Additionally, all groups responded to
ads from all categories of products we advertised, cell phone, computer, jewelry and
auto parts.
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We give more detailed information about the top 10 groups below. Table
3.14 lists details including the number of threads associated with the group, source
and reply-to email addresses, associated shipping addresses and phone numbers for
the top 10 groups by number of threads. Almost all of the top 10 groups had an
extremely high ratio (ranging from 86.9% to 100.0%) of threads whose source email
address is different from the reply-to address, Group 10 had a 86.9% ratio which
was anomalous until it was discovered that a single email address was used as both
the source and reply-to address in 11.1% of the threads.
Interestingly, only one of the top groups had shipping addresses associated with
the group. Our assessment is that 9 groups are more sophisticated in their separation
of initial inquiries and transition to scam attempts, successfully segregating the two
in order to keep their clean accounts and personal information off blacklists. One
group on the other hand appears unconcerned with this separation, working on a
volume basis using the same email addresses and phone numbers for finalizing scam


























1 1096 178 23 100.0% 0 0 18 4 Auto parts
2 993 270 64 98.7% 7 9 20 4 Balanced
3 885 313 48 95.8% 0 2 19 4 Jewelry
4 714 106 37 97.6% 0 0 20 4 Auto parts
5 700 52 11 98.6% 0 2 20 4 Balanced
6 449 182 30 98.0% 0 1 17 4 Auto parts
7 441 60 17 97.5% 0 1 20 4
Auto parts
& Jewelry
8 416 103 10 100.0% 0 0 20 4 Auto parts
9 330 19 8 94.8% 0 0 19 4
Auto parts
& Jewelry
10 306 71 23 86.9%* 0 0 20 4 Auto parts
Table 3.14: Top 10 Groups. Top 10 groups account for about 48% of emails threads. Scam emails of these groups were found in
almost all of 20 cities and they covered 4 categories. They usually use a smaller number of reply-to addresses relative to the number of
source addresses.
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Group First Email Last Email Duration
1 17 Apr 09:00 17 Jul 07:23 91 days
2 17 Apr 23:12 17 Jul 14:03 91 days
3 19 Apr 10:51 16 Jul 22:44 89 days
4 16 Apr 08:37 8 Jul 21:11 84 days
5 16 Apr 20:05 14 Jul 20:33 89 days
6 22 Apr 12:58 16 Jul 22:09 86 days
7 20 Apr 02:45 3 Jul 08:37 75 days
8 16 Apr 18:07 11 Jul 11:15 86 days
9 16 Apr 03:17 2 Jul 11:07 78 days
10 17 Apr 15:04 14 Jul 18:21 89 days
Table 3.15: Top 10 Group Durations.
Table 3.15 and Figure 3.12 show group activities over time. We make the
following interesting observations. First, as mentioned earlier, all top 10 groups were
active throughout the entire duration of the data collection. Second, Figure 3.12
shows that peak activities of a subset of the top 10 groups aligned with each other
(e.g., the 5 plots on the left-hand side had aligned peaks and lulls). As mentioned
later in Section 3.9.3, some of the top 10 groups merged when we used slightly more
aggressive grouping criteria — therefore, it is likely that in reality, a subset of the
top 10 groups are actually the same big group. The aligned peaks and lulls as shown
in Figure 3.12 gives more evidence to support this hypothesis.
Finally, activities for most groups tapered off towards the end of the data col-
lection, partly due to a combination of several reasons: the lack of new postings near
the end of the research period, the expiration of postings created earlier, Craigslist’s
flagging of some of our postings, and additionally, some scammers may have started
detecting our automated data collection.
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Figure 3.12: Emails Per Day - Top 10 Groups. A subset of the top 10 groups show
aligned peaks and lulls. Activities tapered off towards the end, partly due the lack of new
posts and expiration of existing posts.
3.9.3 More Aggressive Grouping Strategy and Findings.
Our first grouping strategy in section 3.9.1 was extremely conservative. There
are many other attributes that we could have used in the grouping, but chose
not to. For example, for similar email addresses, while we manually inspected
a subset of them and marked them as being the same group, such as the afore-
mentioned biglanreXX@gmail.com; for others such as madelineXX@gmail.com and
alexandraXX@gmail.com we conservatively chose not to mark them as the same,
since Madeline and Alexandra are common English names.
We observe, however, that if one applied a slightly more aggressive grouping
criterion, some of the top 10 groups would have merged. For example, Figure 3.11(b)
shows the grouping results if we additionally merged IP addresses from the same
class C subnet to the same group. In this case, the 4th and 10th largest groups from
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Figure 3.11(a) are merged, and is now the biggest group in Figure 3.11(b). The
remaining ordering of the top 10 are preserved.
Figure 3.11(c) shows the grouping results if we additionally merged email
addresses 90% similar to the same group. The similarity between two email addresses
A and B (containing only the substring before ) is defined as:
sim(A,B) := 1− edit dist(A,B)
min(len(A), len(B))
Intuitively, a 90% similarity between two email addresses means every 1 out of 10
characters may be different. In Figure 3.11(c), the 6th and 8th largest groups from
Figure 3.11(a) are merged, and is elevated to the largest group. The remaining
ordering of the top 10 are preserved.
3.9.4 Classification Summary.
Summarizing the above, our classification effort clearly indicates that a small
number of scam groups account for half or more of the total scam activities we
observed. These scam groups work across all cities, and were continuously observed
throughout the data collection.
3.10 Literature Review
There have been a number of previous studies that have looked at the struc-
ture by Smith [5], Buchaman and Grant [11] and estimated losses from advance fee
fraud by Dyrud [23]. Whitty and Buchaman [4] and Rege [24] have investigated the
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dynamics of online dating scams. More broadly, Stajano and Wilson [25] created a
taxonomy of the different types of psychology motivations used by scammers. Garg
and Nilizadeh [26] investigated whether economic, structural and cultural character-
istics of a community affects the scams on Craigslist. Their work focuses on potential
scammers’ advertisements posted on Craigslist. Tive [27] introduced in his study
various techniques of advance fee fraud. Herley [28] has argued that Nigerian scam-
mers deliberately craft their messages to be unbelievable as a method of reducing
the number of replies from people that are unlikely to fall victim to these scams. In
contrast, our study aimed to be more focused on collecting empirical data to enable
a data-driven analysis that does not rely in self reported statistics. Isacenkova et
al. [29] identified a thousand scam groups from an existing scam email dataset with
the help of a multi-dimensional clustering technique. This study also argued that
scammers’ email addresses and phone numbers are crucial factors of the cluster-
ing. Goa et al. [30] investigates the use of ontology-based knowledge engineering for
Nigerian scam email text mining. Unlike previous studies, in our investigation we
have focused on 1) understanding in great depth the prevalence and techniques, and
2) identifying the structure of larger scale groups of scammers that are engaged in
attempting to defraud people posting goods for sale on Craigslist.
Another large body of recent work has set about conducting empirical measure-
ments to understand the dynamics and economic underpinnings of different types
of cybercrime. Much of this work has been focused on spam email [31, 32], illicit
online pharmacies [33], and mapping out scam hosting infrastructure [34, 35]. Our
work builds on this, but focuses deeply on the Nigerian scam problem in particular.
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We have conducted, to our knowledge, the first large scale empirical measurement
study of 419 scams. It provides us with insights into how these scams are organized
and how they might be better deterred in the future.
3.11 Discussion
We have presented an in depth data-driven analysis of Nigerian scammers.
This section will serve to provide a higher level view of our analysis to put it into
context and discuss how our analysis might be used to deter these types of scams.
In addition, we will describe future work that are planning to undertake that will
improve our understand of these scams even further.
Larger Organizations. Our clustering results reveal that a large portion of the
scam attempts are originating from a small set of groups that we can link together
via their reuse of email addresses, shipping address, phone numbers, and similarity
of the content in their messages. Our conservative estimate is that ten groups
are responsible for about 50% of the scam attempts we received4 This indicates
that while this scam is highly prevalent that are only a relative small number of
groups engaged in this activity. If these groups could be disrupted it would have a
large impact on reducing the number of people targeted. As future work we plan to
improve our measurement infrastructure to collect more information such as browser
cookies that will enable us to more accurately cluster these groups. We will also
work on improving our ability to estimate how many individuals are involved in this
4Note as we become less conservative with our clustering criteria some of the small group begin
to merge into the larger groups and some of the larger groups begin to merge together.
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scam and the division of labor among the individuals within each group.
Locations of Scammers. We also find that all of major groups are based in
Nigeria based on IP and shipping addresses. However, some of these groups use
shipping addresses in both Nigeria and the U.S. This indicates that they might have
some limited ability to receive packages and reship them to Nigeria. As future work,
we plan to identify shipping addresses associated with the major groups and ship
them items with GPS tracking units embedded into the device. This will give us
more insight into how and where the stolen goods are resold.
Methods and Tools. Our analysis offers many clues about the level of automation
and sophistication of the tools used by these scammers. We have found strong
evidence of automated tools that are run manually or require manual attending. In
addition, we find that these tools are used to automate both initial responses and in
some cases follow-up responses. Also, some of these tools are able to crawl multiple
geographic regions on Craigslist and parse the posting’s subjects and contents to
include in the reply. However, some the tools are fairly limited and include static
text in the body of the reply or cannot parse subjects of listings. This relative
lack of sophistication in these tools indicate it would be possible to incorporate the
static messages into spam filters and at least force the scammers to develop more
advanced tools. As future work we plan to design experiments focused on gaining
more insight into the tools being used and their limitations. This might include
crafting messages that ask questions targeted at better understand which messages
from the scammers are automated.
Email Account Usage. Our analysis of email accounts used be the scammers,
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shows that they tend to use a large number of email address for the initial message
that are quickly abandoned. However, they normally set the reply-to address in the
initial message to a different email address that is reused often and longer lived.
These longer lived email accounts offer a potentially better point of intervention,
since it is conceivable these accounts can be blacklisted or banned before the scam-
mer completes multiple email exchanges with the victim. In addition, as future work
we will provide these email addresses to webmail providers and corporations such as
PayPal to see if they have been used for other scams. This analysis might in turn
help identify additional email accounts used by these groups.
Filtering Messages. In the course of our analysis we also identified many recurring
themes in the content of the messages. These included the scammers claiming to be
overseas military personnel to explain why they were located in Nigeria. Including
religious content in their messages to gain the trust of their victim. Finally, they
often used abusive language to coerce their victims into actually shipping the items.
In addition, it would be feasible to exploit common linguistic features of scam email
contents [30]. The combination of these patterns and the different reply-to address
might be effectively used to improve the filtering of these messages. As future
work will test this hypothesis by building improved filters that are more effective at
detecting Nigerian scam messages.
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3.12 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented a large scale empirical analysis of targeted
Nigerian scams observed on Craigslist. From this we have learned valuable informa-
tion on a variety of scam patterns such as scammers’ working time and their response
time to our ads and emails and discussed a degree of automation of scam process.
Our analysis of IP addresses and shipping addresses indicates that the majority of
scammers are located in Nigeria, but there is a smaller presence in the USA. We
also found that around 10 groups account for almost half of scam attempts. Finally,
we presented some higher level discussions based on our analysis and identify some
potential points along this scam to intervene that might prove to be effective at
deterring these scams.
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Chapter 4: Rental scams on Craigslist
4.1 Overview
In this chapter, we present our measurement study of rental scams on Craigslist.
We conducted the first systematic empirical study of large-scale online rental scams
on Craigslist. This study was enabled by a suite of techniques that allowed us to
identify scam campaigns and our automated Scambaiter system introduced in chap-
ter 3 that was able to collect additional information by conversing with scammers.
Our measurement study sheds new light on the broad range of strategies different
scam campaigns employ and the infrastructure they depend on to profit. We found
that many of these strategies, such as credit report scams, were targeted directly at
the rental domain and are structurally different from traditional advanced fee fraud
found in previous studies. In addition, we measured the effectiveness of Craigslists
efforts to remove the initial scam postings. Finally, we found that many of the
large-scale campaigns we detected depend on credit card payments, suggesting that
a payment level intervention might effectively demonetize them.
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4.2 Data Sets
This chapter focuses solely on scams and we consider spam, such as off-topic
and aggressive repostings, as outside the scope of this chapter. Throughout this
chapter, we define a rental listing as a scam if i) it is fraudulently advertising a
property that is not available or not lawfully owned by the advertiser and ii) it
attempts to extract money from replies using either advanced fee fraud or “bait-
and-switch” tactics.
The basis of our study relies upon repeated crawls of the rental section on
Craigslist in different geographic locations to collect all listings posted in these re-
gions and detect listings that are subsequently flagged 1 We then use a combination
of manual searching for reported rental scams and human-generated regular expres-
sions to map fraudulent listings into scam campaigns. For a small subset of listings
that are difficult to identify as scams or legitimate, we build an automated conversa-
tion engine that contacts the poster to determine the validity of the listing. Finally,
we crawl five other popular rental listing sites to detect cloned listings that have
been re-posted to Craigslist potentially by scammers.
4.2.1 Rental Listing Crawling
Our primary data set is based on listings collected from daily crawls of rental
sections on Craigslist across 20 different cities and areas in the United States with the
1Craigslist detects and deletes user listings that violate the terms of use (e.g., excessively du-
plicate listings or malicious scam listings).
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Overview
Duration 141 days (2/24/14-7/15/14)
Cities/areas 20
Rental ads
Total posted 2, 085, 663
Flagged for removal 126, 898 (6.1%)
Deleted (by user) 338, 362 (16.2%)
Expired* 1, 620, 403 (77.7%)
Table 4.1: Dataset summary. About 6% of rental ads are flagged for removal by
Craigslist. Rental ads are considered to be expired 7 days after being posted.
largest population [36]: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia,
San Antonio, San Diego, Dallas, San Francisco (Bay area), Austin, Jacksonville,
Indianapolis, Columbus, Charlotte, Detroit, El Paso, Memphis, Boston and Seattle.
Our crawler revisited each crawled ad three days after the first visit to detect if
they have been flagged by Craigslist. The crawler performed a final recrawl of any
unflagged listings 7 days after the first visit to determine if they have been flagged
or expired. We also collected rental ads from five additional major rental listing
websites, Zillow, Trulia, Realtor.com, Yahoo! Homes and Homes.com.
Our crawler tracked all rental section ads on 20 cities/areas on Craigslist, for
a total duration of 141 days, from 2/24/2014 to 7/15/2014. Table 4.1 shows the
overall summary of this dataset. In whole, we collected over two million ads, among
which 126, 898 have been flagged by Craigslist.
4.2.2 Campaign Identification
Our crawling of Craigslist produced a large set of flagged and non-flagged ads
that are potentially scam listings. We know that some of these ads are scams and
that many of these are linked to a smaller number of distinct scam campaigns.
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Due to the large number of ads in our data set a brute-force approach of
manually analyzing a large set of ads would not be effective and would require
a domain specific understanding of how scam ads differ from legitimate ads. In
order to overcome these challenges, we bootstrap our knowledge of scam postings
by finding a small number of suspicious ads in a semi-automated manner. To this
end, we manually surveyed a broad range of user submitted scam reports online [37–
39] to gain some initial insights about rental scams. Based on these insights, we
constructed the following heuristics to identify an initial set of suspicious rental
listings:
• Detect suspicious cloned listings by correlating listings posted to Craigslist
with other rental listing websites, in particular, cloned ads from other sites
that exhibit a substantial price difference (e.g., 20% difference).
• Detect posts with similar contents across multiple cities, e.g., posts with the
same phone number or email addresses.
• Focus on ads flagged by Craigslist, and manually identify suspicious scam
listings. As we will report in detail later, not all flagged posts are scam listings;
and conversely, not all scam posts were flagged by Craigslist
• Identify ads that are similar to user-reported scams.
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4.2.3 Campaign Expansion Phase: Latitudinal
For some of the campaigns we identified and hand labelled a small number of
initial scam posts. Based on these we would like to identify other similar listings
that are part of the same campaigns using automated and semi-automated methods.
To this end, we used an approach that uses human-generated scam signatures.
4.2.3.1 Human-generated scam signatures.
Our first approach is to manually inspect the handful of ads that we identi-
fied to be in the same campaign, and summarize a unique signature to identify this
campaign. For example, one of the credit report scam campaigns have the follow-
ing unique signatures: email accounts corresponding to the regular expression ”[a-
z]+(\s@\s)(yahoo)(\sdot\s)(com)” and no other contact information is included.
We then applied our signatures to all of our crawled ads, to identify additional
ads that belong to the same campaign. As detailed in later sections, we will rely
on a combination of human and automated verification techniques to confirm that
scam ads identified by these signatures are indeed scams.
4.2.4 Campaign Expansion Phase: Longitudinal
For the initial scam postings we identified above, and the suspicious listings
we identified in the latitudinal campaign expansion phase (Section 4.2.3), we wanted
to confirm whether these are indeed scam messages. To this end, we built an au-
tomated conversation engine to converse with the suspected scammer, to see if the
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conversation would lead to a phase where the scammer requested payment from us.
4.2.4.1 Automated conversation engine.
We manually inspected the suspicious ads and found that some of them were
clearly scams, e.g., the ads with a specific phone numbers that were reported as
scams by many users. For others, while the ads appear highly suspicious, we were
not sure whether they were scams as opposed to the more harmless spam posting
from aggressive realtors or other service providers advertising their service/rentals.
We therefore modified the automated conversation engine described in previous
Chapter 3.2.2 to i) verify whether a suspicious ad is a scam and ii) collect additional
data. More specifically, we first selected a few suspicious ads and performed the
email conversations manually. Then it was fairly straightforward to distinguish
between legitimate users and malicious scammers during the email conversation.
For example, clone ads scammers usually wanted to proceed with the rental process
online since they were not in town for good purposes (e.g., serving in mission trip
to Africa). From the preliminary conversations, we were able to generate a set of
linguistic features (e.g., keywords such as “serving in mission” or rent application
templates) and other types of features (e.g., embedded links to certain redirection
servers) that distinguish rental scammers from other legitimate users.
The conversation starts with first emails sent by the conversation engine. First
emails consist of up to three sentences excluding greeting and enclosure. Example
sentences generated for the first emails are listed in Table 4.2. The conversation
76
engine composes the first email using 6 pre-defined sentences for the first sentence,
6 for the second sentence and 5 for the third sentence, making a total of 180 kind
of email contents.
After sending the first email, the conversation engine waits for a response
email from a scammer. Since there exist various kinds of rental scams, different
strategies are deployed for each rental scam category. In case of “clone scam”
which will be described later in Chapter 4.3.2, the conversation engine searches for
specific rent application forms that the scammers usually ask their victims to fill
in. Since scammers usually send more than one response emails (e.g., an email
explaining sacmmer’s situation, an email with pictures of a house and another email
with rent application form), the conversation engine focuses on the application form
only and generate a second email by filling in the received rent application form. We
found 18 kinds of rent application forms during the preliminary experiment and also
during the main experiment. Figure A.12 in Appendix A.3 presents an example rent
application form used by clone scammers. In case of other rental scam categories
such as “credit report scams” (Chapter 4.3.1), the conversation engine does not
send second email to the scammers since the scammers’ first response email usually
contain their scam trials.
We ran the automated conversation engine only for the emails selected based
on a predefined set of features. During the email conversations, we were able to
collect additional data such as email accounts, IP addresses, phone numbers, links
and payment information from the scammers. As in chapter 3, the automated con-




I’m looking for a place to stay and I saw your ad on Craigslist.
I saw your ad on Craigslist and I’d like to ask if you are still looking for
a tenant.
Second
I think your home is suitable for my family so I’d like to ask if I would
be able to rent your house.
Can we meet up so that I can take a look at your house?
Third
Please let me know any time soon.
Please let me know if you have any questions about me.
Table 4.2: Example sentence used in first emails generated by the conversation
engine.
clicks or loads the link in any way, the link leads the scammer to our private web
server that logs the visitor’s IP address. In this way, we were able to collect the IP
addresses of the scammers from two sources: email headers and access logs to the
web server.
4.2.4.2 Ethics.
The longitudinal automation phase is the only part of the data collection
that involved human subjects. We took care to design our experiments to respect
common ethical guidelines and received approval from our institution’s IRB for
this study. As mentioned above, sometimes we rely on automated conversations to
confirm (or disconfirm) whether scams we identify are truly scams. To minimize the
inconvenience brought on legitimate users, we abided by the following guidelines.
First, we only sent automated emails to ads that we suspected to be scams. Detailed
methods are explained in Section 4.3.2 and 4.3.1. Second, we kept the automated
conversations to a low volume. In the entire data collection, we sent out 2,855 emails,
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from which we received 204 responses that were confirmed to be from scammers out
of a total of 367 responses. The rest 163 responses were mostly from apartment
leasing offices who posted several rental listings with different rental prices. Email
conversation with them were usually terminated after one or two rounds of email
exchanges since they usually asked to make phone calls for further help, and this
kind of emails were not responded by our automated conversation engine. Although
those people were not debriefed at the end of the conversation, we believe that we
did not make any serious harm. From these initial results, we were able to improve
our methods for detecting suspicious ads, which would further reduce the number
of legitimate posters contacted. Finally, in some cases we called the phone number
provided by the poster in order to collect additional information. These phone
calls where all manually placed, restricted to low volumes and we only contacted
suspected scam posters.
4.2.5 Campaign Summaries
We present a high-level summary of the major scam categories and campaigns
we identified in Table 4.3. For each campaign we assign it a name based on either
the name of the company that is monetizing the scam when known or a feature
used to identify the listings in the campaign. Applying our campaign identification
methods from Section 4.3, we find seven distinct scam campaigns that account for
32K individual ads. For each campaign the table lists the monetization category of
the scam, the raw number of listings associated with that campaign, the percentage
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Scam category Campaign # Ads % Flagged City Payment
Credit report
CreditReport Yahoo 15, 184 33.0% 20 Credit card










3, 240 62.4% 19 Credit card
New Line Equity 3, 230 43.3% 12 Credit card
Search Rent To Own 1, 664 77.5% 17 Credit card
Total 28, 875 45.2%
Table 4.3: Major rental scam campaigns. Rental scam campaigns of relatively large
size in various rental scam types.
of ads that were flagged, the number of cities we found listings in out of the 20 total
cities we monitored and the payment method used.
4.3 Analysis of Scam Campaigns
In this section, we will present our detailed findings for each campaign, in-
cluding our insights on how the scams are organized, where they are geographically
located and the degree of automation used by each campaign.
4.3.1 Credit Report Scams
In a typical credit report scam, a scammer posts a false rental ad for a property
not owned by the scammer. When a victim user replies to the rental ad, the scammer
asks the victim to obtain their credit score by clicking on a link included in the email.
When the victim clicks the link, a scammer-operated redirection server redirects the
victim to a credit score company and includes a referral ID. If the victim pays for
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the credit score service which accepts credit card payments, the scammer will be
paid a commission by the credit score company through its affiliate program. 2
4.3.1.1 Data collection.
We identified initial postings for each campaign by manually examining the
Craigslist-flagged ads, and correlating contact information and unique substrings
included in the postings with user reports found on scam report sites [37–39]. In
this manner, we identified two major campaigns, henceforth referred to as CreditRe-
port Yahoo and CreditReport Gmail respectively, due to their usage of signature
Yahoo and Gmail email addresses.
From the few examples that we found manually, we latitudinally expanded the
campaign dataset through human-generated signatures. Using the human generated
signatures, we were able to identify additional scam ads from the same campaigns.
Craigslist had failed to flag many of the scam ads we identified. Specifically, for
CreditReport Yahoo campaign, we found 15,184 scam ads of which 33.01% were
flagged for removal by Craigslist. We also found 5,471 scam ads posted by CreditRe-
port Gmail of which 59.27% were flagged. More details are provided in Table 4.3.
4.3.1.2 Dataset sanity check.
We verified the suspicious ads identified by the signatures are indeed scams in
two ways. First, we performed a sanity check by manually investigating 400 ran-
2According to the affiliate program of Rental Verified, which is used by one of the credit report
campaigns we found, it pays up to $18 per customer. https://rentalverified.com/affiliates
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domly selected suspicious ads, 200 from each campaign. We considered a suspicious
ad as a scam if 1) an ad contained no additional contact information such as name,
phone number, street address or URL and 2) there existed same or similar ads with
different email addresses in the same campaign. Through the manual inspection,
we found only one false positive ad in CreditReport Yahoo campaign and two in
CreditReport Gmail. The email addresses used in the false positive ads were also
found in other suspicious ads, and we could also find out actual realtors who used
those email addresses. Second, among a total number of 20,256 credit report scam
ads we identified, we randomly selected 227 and 89 credit report scam ads from
the CreditReport Yahoo and CreditReport Gmail campaigns respectively, and sent
emails in response to the selected ads. Among the emails sent, we received 41 and
78 email responses and all of them were verified to be credit report scams.
4.3.1.3 In-depth analysis.
We present further analysis results of the two credit report scam campaigns.
Both credit report scam campaigns appear to be located in the United States. In
particular, the CreditReport Gmail campaign appears to be located in New York
city; while evidence described later (e.g., diverse IP addresses and short inter-arrival
times within bursts) suggests that the CreditReport Yahoo campaign appears to
rely on a botnet for their operation. We now provide an in-depth analysis of the
IP addresses and email accounts of both campaigns. Table 4.4 lists the overview of
two credit report scam campaigns we found during the experimental period.
82
CreditReport Yahoo CreditReport Gmail
Scam signature
“[a-z]+[ ]@[ ]yahoo.com” or




No other contact information No other contact information
Email account
found






IP addresses 69 30
IP addresses used
once
65 (94.2%) 10 (33.3%)
Country USA (100%) USA (100%)
State 28 states New York (100%)
ISP Various Verizon (100%)
Table 4.4: Credit report scam campaigns.
IP address analysis. For both campaigns, all the IP addresses observed
are located in USA. However, two campaigns show completely different IP address
usage patterns as shown in Table 4.4.
For CreditReport Yahoo, 69 IP addresses were found from 41 email conversa-
tions. The number of observed IP addresses are much larger than the number of
corresponding email conversations since CreditReport Yahoo uses mostly different
IP addresses for each round of conversations. In addition, they rarely reuse any
IP addresses across different email conversations. 94.64% are used only in a single
email conversation, and every IP address is used in at most two email conversations.
The IP addresses are distributed over 24 states in USA and mapped back to residen-
tial ISPs. These observations, combined with others described later (e.g., level of
automation), suggest that this campaign is potentially using a botnet for operation.
















7 62 10.3 3/24/8.5/7.4 5 7
4 67 22.3 0/57/10/30.4 3 4
4 74 24.7 8/57/9/28 3 4
3 9 4.5 0/9/4.5/6.3 3 3
3 11 5.5 1/10/5.5/6.3 3 3
Table 4.5: Example inter-arrival time for burst email responses of CreditRe-
port Yahoo. Emails in the same burst have different content, although they contain a
similar embedded link to a direction server.
from 78 email conversations. Of the 30 IP addresses, about 66.7% were reused in
more than one email conversations and the maximum number of email threads that
share the same IP address is 7. All the observed IP addresses of the CreditRe-
port Gmail campaign are located in New York City, and map back to a single ISP,
Verizon Online LLC.
Level of automation. We observed many signs of scam process automation,
including extremely short inter-arrival time in a burst of emails and duplicate or
templated email messages. Table 4.5 lists example email bursts received from Cred-
itReport Yahoo campaign. Many email bursts consisting of up to 7 emails were
observed and an average inter-arrival time between two emails ranges between 4.5
seconds and 24.7 seconds. Within each burst, emails were always sent from different
IP addresses and therefore, usually sent from different cities. This observation also
supports the use of the widely-deployed botnet. We also observed many duplicate or
templated emails from both campaigns, which are also strong signs of automation.
Example email message frequently observed during the whole experiment is shown
in Figure A.13 in Appendix A.3.
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On the other hand, we also observed signs of manual labor. One example is a
distribution of time of day that we received email messages from scammers. In the
case of CreditReport Yahoo, we never received any email response between 7 PM
and 9 AM EST (Eastern Standard Time) and in case of CreditReport Gmail, there
was no response between 8 PM and 7 AM EST.
4.3.2 Clone Scam
In clone scams, typically a scammer copies another legitimate rental ad from
a different rental website, e.g., realtor.com. The cloned ad typically has the same
street address and sometimes has the same description as the original ad. However,
often the scammer lowers the rental price. This scam is typically monetized by the
scammer requesting a money wire transfer or bank transfer for first months rent and
a deposit.
4.3.2.1 Data collection.
To detect clone scams, our crawler tracked rental posts on Craigslist and 5
other major rental websites. We compared these ads and identified Craigslist rental
ads cloned from other websites.
Overall, we identified 22,852 cloned ads spanning all 20 cities on Craigslist –
however, not all of these are necessarily scam ads. The majority of these appear to
be legitimate users advertising their rentals on multiple websites. We then focused
on the subset of 2,675 cloned ads with a price difference of at least $300. These
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ads are deemed to be suspicious, but we still cannot be sure whether they are truly
scam ads. To verify whether the identified suspicious ads are truly scams, we sent
2, 517 emails to suspicious ads using our automated conversation engines. From the
emails we sent, we received 237 responses among which 85 are verified to be scams.
4.3.2.2 In-depth analysis of confirmed scams.
We now report statistics on the 85 confirmed clone scams. Our major insight
is that most of these scams originate from Nigeria, and are likely operated by a
small number of scam factories. To reach this conclusion, we performed a detailed
analysis of the IP addresses, email addresses, wire transfer requests and bank ac-
count information contained in the scam attempts. We then performed a clustering
algorithm based on identifying information.
IP address analysis. Excluding IPs from well-known web mail provider,
such as Gmail and Microsoft, we observed a total of 89 unique IP addresses located
in 7 countries. We used DB-IP database [40] to geolocate each IP address offline
in order to prevent the leakage of the scammer’s IP address information that would
result from using an online service. 59 out of 89 IP addresses (66.3%) are from
Nigeria and 14 (15.7%) were from the U.S. The result shows fairly similar trend
compared to the result of the previous study 3. which shows 50.3% and 37.6%
of IP addresses of Nigerian sales scammers were from Nigeria and the U.S. Even
though we consider the possibility of proxies or anonymous networks, the consistent
results from two studies strongly imply that the major number of the scammers
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were actually located in Nigeria.
Payment Request Analysis. From our conversations with clone ad posters,
we collected a total of 12 unique payment requests and 8 duplicated requests for
the same name or bank account. 5 out of 12 unique payment requests (41.7%)
are located in the US while 4 (25%) requests are located in Nigeria. For a money
transfer via Western Union or MoneyGram, a sender needs to specify the receiver’s
location information including street address, city and country. However, due to the
small sample size of payment requests it is unclear if there is any bias in the subset
of conversations that resulted in a payment request versus those for which we were
able to collect an IP address.
Phone number analysis. We collected a total of 22 distinct phone numbers
from 24 email threads. 14 (64%) of the observed phone numbers are registered in
the USA, but half of these are identified as VoIP numbers. The rest 8 (36%) phone
numbers were registered in Nigeria.
Clustering. In order to better understand how scammers are organized, we
clustered the emails messages into groups based on similarities of their attributes.
We used a conservative clustering strategy. Any two email threads are classified
into a same group only if they shared one of the following: exactly the same email
accounts, phone numbers, bank accounts, IP addresses or rent application templates.
Since those attributes provide us with fairly explicit clues for clustering, we are
highly confident of our clustering result. Due to the small size of the dataset, it may
not be possible to derive a precise analysis. However, the result implies that these
clone scammers may originate from a small number of scam factories, just as shown
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Group Ads (%) Email accounts Bank accounts Phone numbers
1 31 (36%) 21 4 9
2 16 (19%) 16 2 3
3 6 (7%) 6 0 2
Others 32 (38%) 29 5 8
Total 85 70 11 22
Table 4.6: Top 3 clone scam groups.
in the clustering result of sales scammers in chapter 3.9. Through the clustering,
we found a total of 15 scammer groups. Among them the top 3 groups account for
72% of all observed email threads. More detailed information of the top 3 groups
are illustrated in Table 4.6. While IP addresses of the second and third groups are
largely located in Nigeria, those of the first group are spread over Nigeria, the US,
Malaysia and Egypt.
4.3.3 Realtor service scam
Realtor service scams involve a special type of realtor service, such as pre-
foreclosure rental or rent-to-own rental. This type of rental is attractive to renters,
since they may be able to own the property while paying monthly rent similar to
the usual monthly rent of the same area. Realtor service scam campaigns usually
request a victim to sign up for a private realtor service to get a list of rent-to-own
rentals or pre-foreclosure rentals. To sign up for the service, the victim needs to pay
up to $200 initial fee and/or $40 monthly fee.
While these businesses actually provide their customers with a list of homes,
their rental ads are still considered scams since the ads are typically fake with
unreasonably low rent prices, and/or for properties they do not own. Moreover,
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many user scam reports claim that in most cases, the properties in the provided
list are not even for rent or sale at all. In addition, the refund process is extremely
difficult but this is not explained clearly before the customer signs up for their
services.
4.3.3.1 Data Collection.
As listed in Table 4.3, we found a total of 8,134 realtor service scam ads over all
20 cities of Craigslist, and about 57% of the ads were flagged by Craigslist. Through
the manual inspection on the crawled Craigslist rental ads, we found several phone
numbers and URLs observed frequently across multiple cities on Craigslist. We
then extended the initial sets of phone numbers and URLs by correlating them with
various user scam reports [37–39]. Based on the human generated signatures of
phone numbers and URLs, we identified three large realtor services with advance
fee campaigns: American Standard Online, New Line Equity and Search Rent To
Own.
Among the three campaigns we found, two were identified by sets of phone
numbers and the other campaign was identified by a set of URLs. For the soundness
of the collected phone numbers, we manually called each number and confirmed a
set of numbers actually belong to a same campaign. We confirmed that all phone
numbers of a single campaign leaded us to the same automatic response system.
Then we conversed with a representative over the phone and confirmed the business







Scam Signatures 20 phone numbers 22 phone numbers 5 URLs








BBB rating F Not found Not found. (C/F*)
Table 4.7: Realtor service with advance fee campaigns. *: BBB rating of the
sibling websites.
4.3.3.2 American Standard Online.
American Standard Online (ASO) was identified based on a total of 20 phone
numbers. We gathered the set of phone numbers from our suspicious phone number
detection method and many other sources such as 800notes.com. Using the set of
phone numbers, we found 3,240 rental ads posted by ASO over 19 cities on Craigslist.
Among them, 62.34% were flagged for removal. Their ads offer rentals with much
lower rent prices than other ads in the same area. However, a user is not able to get
the information of the property from ASO representatives on the phone.
Because ASO is a registered company in the USA, we could find their record
from Better Business Bureau (BBB). BBB website shows that the company ASO
has a total of 302 customer complaints and its rating is at the lowest ‘F’. The
record obviously tells us that doing business with ASO could be highly risky. This
also means that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could potentially investigate
this company and enforce fines or criminal penalties that would de- monetize this
campaign.
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According to many user scam reports, the scam process of ASO is as follows.
If a victim calls the number to ask about the rental ad, ASO never answers the
questions about the rental ads. Instead, ASO requests a payment of $199 for an
initial fee to get an access to their pre-foreclosure (or rent-to-own) property database.
Once the victim signs up for the service, ASO provides the victim with a property
list. Due to the nature of the term “pre-foreclosure”, it is usually uncertain that the
properties in the list are actually in the status of pre-foreclosure, and most of them
turns out to be not for rent or sale.
At the time of contract, ASO lures victims by guaranteeing 100% refund after
90 days from the contract in case ASO does not satisfy their customers. However,
their actual refund policy requires a wait of at least 90 days from the contract and
at least 3 denial letters from the owners of the properties in the provided list. It is
obvious that getting the multiple denial letters is extremely difficult.
4.3.3.3 New Line Equity.
New Line Equity (NLE) is an another campaign which provides a special type
of realtor service. We identified NLE based on 22 phone numbers observed over 12
cities. Based on the set of phone numbers, a total of 3,230 NLE rental scam ads
were identified, and 43.34% of them were flagged.
Many user reports claim that the scam process of NLE is quite similar to that
of ASO. A victim calls the number found in a Craigslist rental ads, and NLE requests
an initial fee $9.95 and monthly fee $40.95. Once the victim makes a payment, NLE
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provides him with a list of pre-foreclosure properties. In many cases, however, it
turns out that most of the listed properties are not for rent or sale. We could not find
a record of NLE from BBB, but there exists a record with a similar business name,
New Line of Equity which has a BBB rating of ‘D’. Many user reports complain
about the difficulties in terminating the monthly fee payment.
4.3.3.4 Search Rent To Own.
We identified Search Rent To Own (SRO) based on five URLs frequently ob-
served over 17 cities on Craigslist. Among the five URLs, one was used as the main
URL and the rest were redirection links to the main URL. Based on the set of URLs,
we identified 1,664 SRO rental scam ads of which 77.46% of them were flagged. Sim-
ilarly to the other two campaigns, SRO posts false rental ads on Craigslist and ask
the victims to sign up their services with initial and monthly fees. The BBB record
of this campaign did not exist but we found the records of two sibling websites listed
in SRO website. BBB rating of those two sibling websites were ‘F’ and ‘C’, which
are poor ratings for legitimate businesses.
According to the user reports, SRO first lures a customer by offering 3-day free
trial service. However, SRO does not fully explain that a $39.95 monthly fee will
be charged automatically after the free trial. We found many customer complains
indicating that they were not notified upfront about the fact that monthly fee would
be charged automatically after the free trial.
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4.4 Flagged Ads Analysis
Currently, Craigslist relies on a flagging mechanism to filter out scam and spam
ads. Our measurement study reveals that Craigslist currently flags only about 47%
of all the scam ads that we identified. Further, for a subset of the scams (specifically,
clone scams) that we closely monitored, the median time till flagging (for the ads
that do get flagged) is about 13 hours – see Figure 4.1. The figure also shows that
roughly 60% of clone scam ads remain active for more than 10 hours and 40% remain
active for more than 20 hours.
For other scam categories, our data collection method did not allow us to
obtain the time of flagging due to limitations of our measurement study: First,
monitoring all ads on a per-hour basis would generate too much traffic, and our
experiments were designed to keep our crawler’s traffic volume low. Second, de-
tecting these unknown scams required some manual effort. Hence, for some scam
categories, we did not identify the scam ads soon enough to allow us to monitor
them on a per-hour basis.
Even though revisiting all ads on a per-hour basis is too aggressive, we were
able to revisit all ads we crawled twice after three and seven days to determine
whether they have been flagged. Table 4.8 presents a summary of the composition of
the Craigslist-flagged ads. Of 126,898 Craigslist-flagged ads, we found about 10.2%
are Scams where we found concrete proof of scams via automated email conversation.
On the other hand, about 70.3% are classified as Spams which consists of local ads
that are found usually within a single cities and a few renown legitimate real estate
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Figure 4.1: Time taken to flag scam clone ads. Our system monitored 85 clone
scam ads and found that among the flagged ads, only 40% were flagged within 10
hours from ad posting time. In addition, about 60% were flagged within a day.
Category Campaigns # Ads (%)
Scams
Credit report scam 8, 255 (6.51%)
Clone scam 74 (0.06%)
Realtor service scam 4, 572 (3.60%)
Spams
Local ads 76, 752 (60.48%)
Credit repair ads 2, 234 (1.76%)
Legitimate rental ads 10, 224 (8.06%)
Unidentified 24, 787 (19.53%)
Total 126, 898 (−%)
Table 4.8: Flagged ads categorization. 10.17% of flagged ads are identified as
scams while 70.30% are identified as spams.
companies. This leaves 24,787 (19.5%) ads as Unidentified where we were not able
to ascertain if the ads were benign or malicious. Some of these could be clone ads or
other lower volume Rent scams, but they are unlikely to be part of a higher volume
template-based campaign based on the diversity of their content.
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4.5 Discussion
This section will serve to provide a higher level view of our analysis to put
into context the value of this study and potential limitations.
4.5.1 Potential detection and conversation limitations.
The heuristics we used to detect and validate scam posting were highly accu-
rate based on our analysis. However, it still leaves the question of how many scam
listings we did not detect. Without ground truth we cannot provide an estimate
for this question. A fair set of assumptions is that our heuristics performed well at
detecting the majority of listings associated with larger templated campaigns and
worse on the cloned and manually generated rent scam listings, due to the fact that
it is difficult to detect these based on the contents of the listing. In spite of this, we
do detect some cloned ads and are able to gain an understanding of the structure
of their scams from our conversations with these scammers.
4.5.2 Similarities and differences with previous study.
Chapter 3 focused on understanding the structure of scammers posing as buy-
ers on Craigslist. The study found that 70% of scammers provided physical shipping
addresses located in Nigeria. Furthermore, the study found evidence of a largely
manual work force that would respond to scams within 1-2 days during peak work
hours in Nigeria.
In this study, we find a diversity of scams that depend on different sets of
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infrastructure as well as rent scammers that are structured similarly to those that
were encountered in their study. The credit report scams depend on credit report
companies in the United States that operate affiliate programs and payout com-
missions for generating sales. The “bait-and-switch” campaigns depend on rental
service businesses that are often incorporated in the United States and accept credit
card payments with deceptive refund and re-billing policies.
4.6 Related Works
4.6.1 Advanced fee fraud.
There have been a number of previous studies that have looked at the structure
by Smith [5], Buchanan and Grant [11] and estimated losses from advance fee fraud
by Dyrud [23]. Whitty and Buchaman [4] and Rege [24] have investigated the
dynamics of online dating scams. More closely related to our domain, Johnson [10]
explored the offline methods of real estate scammers. More broadly, Stajano and
Wilson [25] created a taxonomy of the different types of psychology motivations used
by scammers. Garg and Nilizadeh [26] investigated whether economic, structural
and cultural characteristics of a community affects the scams on Craigslist. Tive [27]
introduced in his study various techniques of advance fee fraud. Herley [28] has
argued that Nigerian scammers deliberately craft their messages to be unbelievable
as a method of reducing the number of replies from people that are unlikely to fall
victim to these scams. In contrast, our study aimed to be more focused on collecting
empirical data to enable a data-driven analysis of rental scams that does not rely
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on self reported statistics.
Goa et al. [30] investigates the use of ontology-based knowledge engineering
for Nigerian scam email text mining. Isacenkova et al. [29] analyzed public scam
email datasets mostly aggregated from numerous user reports. They identified over
1,000 different scam campaigns largely based on phone numbers. Huang et al. [41]
measured romance scammer techniques on dating websites. Our work builds on
this, but focuses on scammers that are posting fraudulent rental lists targeting
people seeking housing on Craigslist. Unlike previous studies, our investigation we
have focused on 1) understanding in-depth the modi operandi and infrastructure
leveraged by rental scammers operating on Craigslist, and 2) identifying methods
to detect larger-scale scam campaigns and scammers that are engaged in posting
fraudulent rental lists.
4.6.2 Underground studies.
Another large body of recent work has set about conducting empirical mea-
surements to understand the dynamics and economic underpinnings of different
types of cybercrime. Much of this work has been focused on spam email [31, 32],
illicit online pharmacies [33], and mapping out scam hosting infrastructure [34,35].
Our work builds on this, but focuses deeply on fraudulent rental lists in particular.
We have conducted, to our knowledge, the first large scale empirical measurement
study of fraudulent rental lists. It provides us with insights into how these scams
are monetized and how they might be better detected in the future.
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4.7 Conclusion
Rental scams on Craigslist are a real threat encountered by many people
searching for housing online; we found about 29K rental scam postings on Craigslist
across 20 major cities in 141 days. These fraudulent postings are designed to at-
tract people interested in locating housing and target them with scams tailored
to the rental domain. Based on our analysis of these scams we have identified a
few potential chokepoints in rental scams that merit further investigation. We also
note that analysis of online rental markets in other countries would be beneficial to
improving our understanding of rental scams in other locations.
In this chapter, we presented a systematic empirical measurement study of
rental scams observed on Craigslist. As part of this study we present techniques that
are effective at identifying rental scam postings and classifying them into larger scam
campaigns. In parallel, we contacted a subset of these scammers to gain detailed
information about the infrastructure required for them to profit. In total we identify
seven major rental scam campaigns of which five depend on credit card payments
for deceptively advertised services and businesses that are often registered in the
United States. Finally, we find that filtering efforts by Craigslist remove less than
half of the listings we detected. We believe that our techniques for identifying scam
campaigns and understanding of their infrastructure could provide more effective
methods for disrupting rental scams.
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Chapter 5: Understanding and Deterring the Business of DDoS Ser-
vices
5.1 Overview
DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service)-for-hire services, also known as booters,
have commoditized DDoS attacks and enabled abusive subscribers of these services
to cheaply extort, harass and intimidate businesses and people by taking them of-
fline. However, due to the underground nature of these booters, little is known
about their underlying technical and business structure. In this chapter, we empir-
ically measure many facets of their technical and payment infrastructure. We also
perform an analysis of leaked and scraped data from three major booters—Asylum
Stresser, Lizard Stresser and VDO—which provides us with an in-depth view of
their customers and victims. Finally, we conduct a large-scale payment intervention
in collaboration with PayPal and evaluate its effectiveness as a deterrent to their
operations. Based on our analysis, we show that these booters are responsible for
hundreds of thousands of DDoS attacks and identify potentially promising methods
to undermine these services by increasing their costs of operation.
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5.2 Background
In this section we explain the high level business and technical structure of
booter services as well as the underlining ethical framework for our measurements.
5.2.1 Distributed Denial-of-Service
Denial-of-Service (DoS) refers to an attack attempt to make a target machine
or network unavailable to its intended users, that is, preventing legitimate users
from accessing the target’s online services such as website or web service [42]. The
attack is usually conducted by transmitting excessive amount of traffic to the target
machine. Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) is a type of DoS attack where mul-
tiple attack sources are used. This is a coordinated attack on a target machine or
network conducted through many number of compromised machines [45]. DDoS at-
tack can be done more effectively with the use of amplification servers which receive
small amount of traffic from an attacker and then send relatively larger amount of
traffic to a target. For this purpose, an attacker should compromise amplification
servers or locate misconfigured amplification servers. One of typical amplification
servers is Domain Name Service (DNS) server. With DNS amplification, the ratio of
query size to response size is 70:1– this means that an attacker can generate 70Gbps
traffic to a target by just sending 1Gbps traffic to a DNS amplification server.
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5.2.2 Booter Services
Booter services have existed since at least 2005 and primarily operate using a
subscription-based business model. As part of this subscription model, customers
or subscribers 1 can launch an unlimited number of attacks that have a duration
typically ranging from 30 seconds to 1-3 hours and are limited to 1-4 concurrent
attacks depending on the tier of subscription purchased. The price for a subscription
normally ranges from $10-$300 USD per month depending on the duration and
number of concurrent attacks provided. These services claim that they are only to
be used by network operators to stress test their infrastructure. However, they have
become synonymous with DDoS-for-hire.
These services can be found by visiting underground forums where they ad-
vertise and by web searches for terms, such as “stresser” and “booter.” The services
are all in English; we did not find any evidence of similar services focused on other
markets, such as Asia or Russia. They maintain frontend sites that allow their cus-
tomers to purchase subscriptions and launch attacks using simple web forms. Their
backend infrastructure commonly consists of databases that maintain subscriber in-
formation, and lists of misconfigured hosts that can be used for DDoS amplification.
Rather than using botnets, most booter services rent high-bandwidth Virtual Pri-
vate Servers (VPS) as part of their attack infrastructure. Ironically, booter services
depend on DDoS-protection services, such as CloudFlare, to protect their frontend
and attack infrastructure from attacks launched by rival competing booter services.













Figure 5.1: Structure of booter services.
Figure 5.1 provides a detailed illustration of the infrastructure and process of
using a booter service. (1) The customer first locates a booter site and visits their
frontend webserver, which is normally protected by CloudFlare. (2) The customer
must next purchase a subscription using a payment method, such as Bitcoin or
PayPal. (3) The customer then uses the frontend interface to request a DDoS attack
against a victim. (4) This request is forwarded from the frontend server to one of the
backend attack servers. (5) The backend server then sends spoofed request packets
to a set of previously identified misconfigured amplification servers. (6) Finally,
DDoS traffic in the form of replies is sent to the victim from the amplification
servers.
5.2.3 Ethical Framework
As part of the ethical framework for our study, we consulted with our insti-
tution’s general counsel and placed restrictions on the types of booter services we
actively interacted with along with what we included in this chapter. First, we did
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not engage with any DDoS service that advertised using botnets and ceased active
engagement with any booter that we realized was using botnets. For example, in
the case of Lizard Stresser, when we became aware that a botnet was being used,
we immediately abandoned plans to collect active attack measurements from this
service and restricted ourselves to passive measurements. Our victim server was
connected by a dedicated 1 Gbs network connection that was not shared with any
other servers. We also obtained consent from our ISP and their upstream peering
points before conducting any DDoS attack experiments. We also minimized the
attack durations, notified our ISP (Internet Service Provider) before launching any
attack and had a protocol in place to end an attack early if it caused a disruption
at our ISP.
There were no other methods for us to obtain measurements of their attack in-
frastructure, such as the set of amplifiers used and rate of usage, except for launching
attacks. Our method did create some harm to amplifiers and their upstream peer-
ing points by consuming bandwidth resources which we quantify in Table 5.1. The
largest amount of bandwidth consumed was 564.56 kbps for Character Generation
Protocol (CHARGEN) [43] amplifiers and the least was 3.89 kbps for Simple Service
Discovery Protocol (SSDP) [44] amplifiers. Over the course of our experiments we
did not receive any complaints from the operators of these amplifiers. Based on our
analysis, longer 1 hour attacks only discovered about 20% additional amplifiers over
a one minute attack. Given this, we would recommend shorter one minute attacks
for future self-attack based experiments to further minimize bandwidth consumed
when measuring booters’ attack infrastructure.
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Type Avg # of requests Avg bandwidth
CHARGEN 22.76 (s) 564.56 (kbps)
NTP 1.07 (s) 231.43 (kbps)
DNS 0.71 (s) 12.71 (kbps)
SSDP 0.18 (s) 3.89 (kpbs)
Table 5.1: Average number of requests per second and average bandwidth
consumed in kbps for each amplifier.
In order to profile the attack infrastructure used by booters and gain insights
into how they operate we had to purchase subscriptions. When purchasing a sub-
scription for a booter service, we selected the cheapest option to minimize the
amount of money given to these services. In total, we spent less than $140 and
no individual booter service received more than $19 in payments as part of the
measurements in this study. Payments were made primarily using PayPal and we
assumed that proper controls were put in place at PayPal to mitigate the risk of
money flowing to criminal groups. Also, the 9 booters that overlapped with our
payment intervention study likely lost larger sums of money due to our reporting of
their PayPal accounts than we paid to them. As part of our design methodology, we
minimized the amount of money paid and targeted a small set of booters to obtain
valuable measures of their attack infrastructure.
We received an exemption from our Institutional Review Board (IRB), since
our study did not include any personally identifiable information and was based
on publicly leaked data and scraped data that was publicly accessible. The leaked
data contained usernames that did not identify the true names of subscribers, email
addresses that again did not directly reveal the real identify of subscribers, and the
IP addresses of subscribers used to login into the service. We did not include any raw
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data from these leaks or scrapes and we made no attempts to link this information
to the real identities of subscribers. The leaks and scrapes also contained victim’s
IP addresses. Again, we did not include any raw victim’s IP addresses and we did
not mention any victims directly in the chapter. When dealing with publicly leaked
and scraped data, our protocol was to create no additional harm from our analysis
or what we included in the chapter.
5.3 Related Work
DDoS attack and defense techniques have been studied for close to two decades [45–
52]. There have also been several empirical studies of DDoS attacks in the wild using
backscatter analysis [53] which were revisited by Wustrow et al. [54]. More recent
studies have measured Network Time Protocol (NTP) based DDoS attacks and con-
ducted broader measurements of UDP amplifiers along with introducing methods
to identify spoofing-enabled networks [56].
Other studies have explored the structure of botnet based DDoS attacks [57]
and malware [58, 59]. However, the closest related work to ours in this vein is by
Welzel et al. which measured the impact of DDoS attacks on victims by monitoring
two DDoS botnet families and analyzing the service availability of the victims under
attack [60] and an analysis of a leaked database from a single booter service, which
presents the attack infrastructure and pattern, and the victims of the DDoS attacks,
done by Karami and McCoy [61]. Our work differs from this previous work in that
we are focused on holistically understanding the stakeholders and infrastructure
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these booter services rely on to operate across a larger set of booter services.
Our study is in the same vein as prior work that views security problems
through an economic lens [62]. We set out to understand the stakeholders and
infrastructure of criminal DDoS-for-hire enterprises as has been done in other do-
mains. Since booters are a criminal support service rather than the previously
studied domain of abusive advertising [6,33,63] , they operate under a different set
of constraints. In this respect our work is more along the lines of studies focused on
criminal support services, such as email spam delivery [31,64], fake social links [65]
and fake account creation [66].
In Section 4, we show that even though booter services are criminal-to-criminal
enterprises their payment methods more closely resemble those of consumer-to-
criminal. Using a methodology similar to that presented by Clayton et al. [67],
we show that there is a concentration of booters that accept payments using Pay-
Pal. This indicates that the follow-the-money and payment intervention approach
which has been demonstrated to be effective in previous studies [7] would be partially
effective at undermining booter services.
The largest contribution of our study is in characterizing the ecosystem of
subscription-based booter services, which has not been studied in much depth. We
show that these booters are structured differently than traditional botnet based
DDoS services that are rented for a fixed time period in terms of the underlying
attack infrastructure, customer base, business model and payment methods. We
believe that our findings enable a better understanding of the effectiveness of ongoing
efforts to disrupt their attack infrastructure at the amplifier and hosting level. We
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11,975 2,779 $52,773* 138,010 38,539
Total - 50,985 6,918 $91,522.54 637,381 184,919
Table 5.2: Summary of Asylum Stresser and Lizard Stesser leaked databases
and scraped VDO reported data. † Revenue was converted from bitcoin to USD.
*Revenue is estimated based on subscription cost and number of paying subscribers. ‡
Domain name is abbreviated to the first three characters.
also offer a detailed analysis of the nature of these services, how they are structured
and a preliminary evaluation of the potential effectiveness of a payment intervention.
5.4 Inside View of Booters
In this section, we analyze publicly leaked backend booter databases and
scraped data. From this analysis we present some numbers to better understand
the dynamics and scale of booter services. This includes, the amount of revenue
generated, the number of users, the number of victims and the number of attacks
initiated by the subscribers of these services.
5.4.1 Data Sets
Our datasets for this section are comprised of two leaked backend databases for
Asylum and Lizard Stresser and scraped data from VDO. A summary of these data
sets is included in Table 5.2. Before presenting our analysis, we will first describe
each of these data sets in more detail.
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VDO Scraped Data. At the time we started monitoring VDO to measure the
scale of its operation in early December 2014, it was one of the top booter services on
underground forums with a high rate of positive reviews. During an 8 weeks period
ending in early February 2015, we crawled this booter on 10-minutes intervals to
collect data on users of the service and details of attacks launched by them. We
found VDO to be unique in reporting a wealth of public data on its users and
their attack details. This data includes a list of users logged into the service in
the last 15 minutes where paid subscribers were distinguished from unpaid users.
Also, the booter displayed a list of all currently running attacks and their details
including the attack type, target, and duration. Users were able to optionally choose
to remain anonymous when logging into the service and hide the IP address or URL
of the target when initiating an attack. However, the default option was for all the
information to be public and we found only less than 30% of scraped login records
to be anonymous and the target was hidden for 39% of all the attack instances we
observed during the 8 weeks monitoring period.
While we cannot fully vet this self-reported data, we did verify that the data
representing our actions were reported accurately. We also validated that all NTP
attacks reported for a day were accurate by sending monlist requests in 10-minute
intervals to a set of 12 NTP amplifiers known to be abused by VDO and recorded the
received responses. A total of 44 distinct victims were the target of NTP attacks
as reported by VDO during that 24 hour time period and we were able to find
matching records for all 44 targets in the monlist responses collected from the set
of monitored NTP servers. This gives us some increased level of confidence that the
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details of reported attacks and users are accurate.
Asylum Stresser Backend Database. Asylum Stresser was an established booter
that was in operation for over two years before their backend database — containing
18 months of operational data that included user registrations, payments and attack
logs — was publicly leaked. It ceased operation shortly after the leak and has not
resumed operation. This leaked database has been vetted by many members of the
anti-DDoS community that located their own test accounts in the user registration
data and is believed to be authentic.
Lizard Stresser Backend Database. Lizard Stresser was launched in late Decem-
ber of 2014 by individuals calling themselves the Lizard Squad. This same group
was responsible for DDoS attacks on Sony PlayStation and Microsoft Xbox net-
works on December 25, 2014. Their backend database covering their first two weeks
of operation that included user registrations, payments and attack logs was publicly
leaked. Since all payments were made in bitcoin and the associated wallet addresses
are included, we could validate that the database is accurate. We have also checked
for internal consistency within these leaked databases. While we cannot rule out
that some of the data has been fabricated, it would take a fair amount of resources
to create this high fidelity of a forgery.
5.4.2 Subscribers
We find that 15% of Asylum users and 23% of all VDO users purchased a
subscription, compared to less than 2% of all Lizard Stresser users 2. This might
2Note that Lizard Stresser did not offer free trial accounts.
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be attributed to the fact that Asylum and VDO both accepted PayPal payments at
least sporadically while Lizard Stresser only accepted Bitcoin as a payment method.
It is difficult to attribute why the conversion rate of registered users to subscribers
is much less for Lizard Stresser, since other factors, such as the media coverage,
might have also driven many users to sign up out of curiosity. The Lizard Stresser’s
leaked database contains a total of 225 user support tickets. Out of these, 42 are
related to user requests for purchasing subscriptions using PayPal. As one potential
attacker wrote, “I want to pay via paypal real bad I’m a huge fan of and want to
buy this ASAP but I don’t have bitcoins.”
5.4.3 Revenue
Asylum collected 99.4% ($35,180.14) of their revenue through PayPal pay-
ments and only 0.6% ($201.40) of their revenue was collected using their secondary
payment method of MoneyBookers. Lizard Stresser collected all their revenue
through their only supported payment method of Bitcoin and VDO accepted both
PayPal and Bitcoin. They are presumably profitable, but these individual booters
do not generate the profits required to pay the upfront capital, fees and potential
fines for dedicated credit card merchant processing accounts. This amounted to
around $25-$50K per an account, as was the case with illicit pharmaceutical and




From the leaked data we find that these three booters were responsible for over
half a million separate attacks against over 100,000 distinct IP addresses. While
the average attack from VDO only lasted 27 minutes, this data demonstrates the
large-scale abuse problems and unwanted traffic generated by these services. Our
analysis of victims finds that they are predominantly residential links and gaming-
related servers, with a small number of higher profile victims, such as government,
media and law enforcement sites. This matches previous analysis of victims from
leaked databases [61]. For VDO our scraped data included the type of DDoS attack
launched and our analysis of this data shows that amplified attacks, where the
adversary attempts to exhaust the bandwidth capacity of the victim’s connection,
accounted for 72% of all attacks launch from VDO. The next most popular class of
attacks were SYN flooding attacks, which made up only 16% of all attacks.
5.5 Attack Infrastructure
Our measurements of booters’ attack infrastructure are based on engaging with
these services to understand what techniques and hosts are being actively used for
attacks. Using this information might better inform defenders as to which ISPs and
hosts to focus on for blacklisting, remediation and notification efforts. Our analysis
of frontend servers finds a reliance on CloudFlare to protect booter’s infrastructure
from takedown and DDoS. In addition, we find that booters gravitate to using more
stable amplifier infrastructure when possible. This differs from previous studies
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that scan the Internet for the vulnerable populations of misconfigured amplification
servers many of which might be transient and not be used for DDoS attacks. We
also identify two hosting providers connected to the same ISP that are actively
courting booter operators and providing stable high bandwidth attack servers that
allow spoofing.
5.5.1 Data Set
Our first task was to identify booter services for this part of our study. Absent
a centralized location for finding booters, we found services via search engines and
advertisements on hacker forums. We selected 15 booter services that received the
most positive feedback on underground forums for our attack infrastructure char-
acterization. The number of booters was kept relatively small in order to minimize
the amount of money we paid to these services. We make no claim about the cov-
erage these booters provide of the entire ecosystem. Rather, we were looking to
provide a sample of stable services ranked highly for search terms associated with
booter services. In addition, these booters garnered the most positive replies to
their advertisements on underground forums.
We purchased a one month subscription from each of the services which ranged
from $2.50-18.99 and focused on measuring amplification attacks based on our mea-
surements of VDO that showed it was the most common type of attack. In addition,
amplification attacks were the default attack type for all 15 booters. More precisely,
we chose to measure the most common amplification reflection attack types offered
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by the booters, which were SSDP, NTP, DNS and Chargen. Table 5.3 shows the set
of booters, the four attack types that booter offered and the cost of a basic month
subscription.
We conducted attacks directed at our target server from December 2014 -
January 2015. The goal of these attacks was to map out the set of misconfigured
hosts that were being used by each booter to amplify their reflection attacks. The
configuration of our target system used for measuring the attacks was an Intel Xeon
3.3GHz server running Ubuntu with 32 GB of RAM and an isolated 1 Gbps dedicated
network connection.
We used gulp [69], which is a lossless Gigabit packet capture tool to capture
attack traffic. Each attack lasted for one hour total and was comprised of many
shorter attack instances of 10 minutes each, which is the standard time limit for
basic subscriptions. The reasoning behind the longer attack times was to increase
our probability of identifying all the misconfigured reflection hosts used by a booter
for each attack type.
5.5.2 Frontend Servers
Booter services maintain a frontend website that allows customers to purchase
subscriptions and launch DDoS attacks using convenient drop-down menus to specify
the attack type and victim’s IP or domain name. These frontend websites commonly
come under DDoS attack by rival booters and are subject to abuse complaints from
anti-DDoS working groups. All 15 booters in our study use CloudFlare’s DDoS
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Table 5.3: List of booter services we measured, the attack types offered, and
the cost of the least expensive one-month subscription.
protection services to cloak the ISP hosting their frontend servers and to protect
them from abuse complaints and DDoS attacks.
As part of this study, we contacted CloudFlare’s abuse email on June 21st
2014 to notify them of the abusive nature of these booters. As of the time of writing
this dissertation, we have not received any response to our complaints and the still
active subset of booters continue to use CloudFlare. This supports the notion that at
least for our set of booters CloudFlare is a robust solution to protect their frontend
servers. In addition, crimeflare.com has a list of over 100 booters that are using
CloudFlare’s services to protect their frontend servers.
5.5.3 Attack Servers
Renting back-end servers to generate attack traffic is the primary expense for
operators of booter services. We did some research to get a broad sense of the
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Provider VPS IP Uplink speed Bandwidth Monthly cost
CaVPS Host 192.210.234.203 3.5 Gbps Unmetered $35
Spark Servers 96.8.114.146 949 Mbps 10 TB $60
Table 5.4: Spoofing enabled VPS services.
market availability and cost of back-end servers that allow the source IP address
to be spoofed. Being spoof friendly, fast uplink speed and high caps or unmetered
bandwidth usage are the key requirements of a server appropriate for supporting the
operation of a booter service. Providers of spoof friendly Virtual Private Servers
(VPS) can be located on the same underground forums as where booters advertise
their services. These VPS providers often explicitly advertise the ability to spoof
source IP addresses as one of their key features.
In order to understand if these services delivered on their claims of allowing
spoofing and providing the bandwidth they advertised we rented VPS from two
hosting providers that advertised on underground forums. We rented one of the
spoof-friendly virtual servers directly from a booter service included in our study.
Table 5.4 summarizes the services that we purchased. Both of the VPSs we
purchased were connected to the same ISP (ColoCrossing) in the US. We also verified
that both VPSs allowed spoofing and measured their actual link speeds. One VPS
provided around 1Gbps uplink bandwidth and the other one provided up to 3.5Gbps.
Due to budget limitations we could only rent these two VPSs and did not rent
any higher end dedicated servers. However, our initial results show that this is a
potentially effective method of mapping out abusive hosting and we plan to scale
this part of our measurements as future work.
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ANO - - 1,827 73% - - - -
BOO 370 65% - - 1,764 86% - -
CRA - - 43,864 56% - - 64,874 46%
GRI - - - - 1,701 72% 10,121 60%
HOR - - - - 8,551 58% 242,397 30%
INB - - 38,872 55% 4,538 92% 170,764 54%
IPS 1,636 44% - - 1,669 85% 90,100 29%
K-S 1,422 30% - - - - 5,982 76%
POW - - - - - - 1,424,099 11%
QUA - - 10,105 85% - - 39,804 67%
RES - - 2,260 82% 27 100% - -
SPE 2,358 38% 26,851 61% 6,309 35% 258,648 24%
STR - - 93,362 53% - - 7,126 74%
VDO - - 16,133 82% 6,325 82% 150,756 62%
XR8 - - 44,976 52% - - - -
Total 4,565 23.46% 181,298 35.30% 17,599 42.31% 2,145,015 11.84%
Table 5.5: Number of total amplification servers and percentage of overlap
with amplification servers used by other booters.
5.5.4 Attack Techniques
Due to their effectiveness, amplified volume-based attacks are the default at-
tack technique offered by most booter services. We focused our analysis on SSDP
(more commonly known as Universal Plug and Play (UPnP)), DNS, NTP and Char-
gen. These attacks depend on servers running misconfigured UPnP, DNS resolvers,
NTP and Chargen services that enable attackers to amplify attack traffic by sending
spoofed packets with the victim’s source address in the IP header and having these
services respond with a larger amount of traffic directed to the victim.
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5.5.5 Amplifiers
As part of our measurements we can map out the set of amplifiers that are
being abused to magnify the traffic volume of attacks. This sheds light on the pop-
ulation of hosts that are not only potential amplifiers, but are actively being used
as amplifiers for DDoS attacks. Table 5.5 shows that the set of abused Chargen
and NTP servers are smaller and more highly shared between two or more services,
whereas there is an ample supply of DNS and SSDP servers that are used as ampli-
fiers. However, the overlap of DNS servers used by two or more booter services is
still relatively high suggesting that these DNS resolvers might be more stable, have
higher bandwidth connections and be in more limited supply.
5.5.6 Amplifier Location
As demonstrated by Table 5.6, both the geolocation and AS of amplifiers
used by booters are fairly diffuse. There are a few notable exceptions, such as the
concentration of Chargen amplifiers in China with three Chinese ASs connecting
34% of these amplifiers. In addition, there is a slight concentration of abused NTP
servers connected to one Taiwanese AS and two United States network operators.
This might indicate a potential to focus notification and patching efforts on these
networks, given the limited pool of hosts used for Chargen and NTP attacks from
Table 5.5. Feeds of these actively abused servers could also be distributed to these
network operators and to DDoS mitigation services.
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CC % AS %
Chargen
CN 48.78% 4134 (Chinanet) 14.46%
US 12.51% 37963 (Hangzhou Alibaba Advertising) 10.47%
KR 5.50% 4837 (CNCGROUP China169 Backbone) 6.88%
RU 4.58% 17964 (Beijing Dian-Xin-Tong Network) 2.61%
IN 2.56% 7922 (Comcast Cable Communications) 2.61%
DNS
US 12.38% 4134 (Chinanet) 2.68%
RU 11.58% 3462 (Data Communication Business Group) 2.15%
BR 9.19% 18881 (Global Village Telecom) 1.46%
CN 6.84% 4837 (CNCGROUP China169 Backbone) 1.45%
JP 3.61% 7922 (Comcast Cable Communications) 1.27%
NTP
US 31.47% 3462 (Data Communication Business Group) 14.01%
TW 15.29% 46690 (Southern New England Telephone) 12.35%
CN 10.68% 7018 (AT&T Services) 4.84%
KR 5.50% 4134 (Chinanet) 3.58%
RU 4.74% 4837 (CNCGROUP China169 Backbone) 2.18%
SSDP
CN 36.26% 4837 (CNCGROUP China169 Backbone) 18.98%
US 19.37% 4134 (Chinanet) 11.16%
EG 6.83% 8452 (TE Data) 6.61%
AR 5.37% 22927 (Telefonica de Argentina) 5.13%
CA 5.36% 7922 (Comcast Cable Communications) 4.60%
Table 5.6: Top country locations and autonomous systems for amplifiers.
5.5.7 Amplifiers Churn
In order to measure the stability of these amplifiers we probed them period-
ically for 13 weeks to understand how many were still located at the same IP and
misconfiged. As shown in Figure 5.2, the set of DNS resolvers were the most stable
with nearly 80% still misconfiged and located at the same IP after one month, and
over 60% were still misconfigured after 13 weeks. This result is counter to the pre-
vious results of churn based on Internet wide scanning that found a 50-60% churn
rate for DNS servers after one week [56]. It potentially indicates that booters have
gravitated to using a more stable set of DNS resolvers and that focusing mitigation
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Figure 5.2: IP churn of amplifiers.
efforts on these might cause these DNS attacks to be less efficient and require addi-
tional bandwidth and cost. However, our measurements were collected after those
in the previous study making direct comparisons challenging.
5.5.8 Amplification Factor
One of the few direct costs incurred for every attack a booter service launches
is the bandwidth sent from their rented attack servers. In order to reduce this cost
amplification attacks are used for volume-based flooding attacks. Our amplifica-
tion factor measurements largely agree with the lower-end bandwidth amplification
factor numbers reported in a previous study [56], with NTP attacks resulting in
an average amplification factor of 603 times. Chargen was the next largest at 63
times, DNS resulting in an average of 30 times amplification and SSDP generating
the smallest average amplification factor of 26 times. This and the limited number
of NTP amplifiers confirms that the communities focus on prioritizing notification
and patching of misconfigured NTP servers is the correct approach. We also suggest
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that some effort be placed into notifying operators of servers with misconfigured and
abused Chargen services, since these are the next largest threat and there is also a
potentially constrained supply.
5.6 Payment Intervention
As part of our study we sought out opportunities to understand and also
measure the effectiveness of undermining DDoS Services. In this section, we present
our measurements of a payment intervention that was conducted in collaboration
with PayPal and the FBI.
We find that reporting accounts to responsive payment service providers, such
as PayPal, can have the desired effect of limiting their ability and increasing the risk
of accepting payments. This technique requires constant monitoring of the booters
and drives them to move to more robust payment methods, such as Bitcoin.
5.6.1 Payment Ecosystem
At the onset of our study, the majority of booter services accepted credit
card payments via PayPal as their primary mechanism for receiving funds from
their customers. In addition, some booters accepted bitcoin payments and a limited
number accepted credit card payments using Google Wallet3 and virtual currencies,
such as WebMoney and Perfect Money. These last two prohibit customers from the
United States from opening an account and using their platform.
3Google phased out their digital goods payment processing at the start of March 2015 —
https://support.google.com/wallet/business/answer/6107573.
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We identified a larger set of 60 booter services 4 that accepted PayPal and
created custom crawlers to monitor their payment methods and merchant accounts
for about 6 weeks from April 22, 2014 through June 07, 2014. To receive their
payments using PayPal, booter services redirect customers to the PayPal website
where existing PayPal users can login and complete a transaction. After logging
into PayPal, our crawlers were able to collect the merchant account identifier of the
corresponding booter service from the HTML source of the page without completing
a transaction.
The set of booters selected for monitoring were located from underground
forum advertisements and web searches for terms commonly associated with booter
services. Again we make no claim about the coverage these booters provide of the
entire ecosystem. To minimize the effect of unstable booters on our study, the final
set of booters included in our analysis was limited to the 23 stable booter services
that were able to successfully use PayPal to receive funds for at least half of the
time before the PayPal intervention and used at least one PayPal account after the
intervention. Nine of these 23 booter services overlapped with the set of 15 booters
measured in section 5.5. Among the reasons that six booters were not included in
this measurement is that some did not accept PayPal and others did not accept
PayPal over half the time in the first 6 week period.
After collecting our initial data on the stability of their PayPal merchant
accounts, we reported these booter’s domains and accounts to PayPal. The or-
4This set is larger than the previous set, since we did not have to pay for a subscription in order
to monitor their payment accounts.
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ganization then began to monitor merchant accounts linked to these domains and
suspended them after an investigation. Note that PayPal will initially limit mer-
chant accounts that are found to violate their terms of service by accepting payments
for abusive services until they perform an investigation of the account. Once an ac-
count is limited the merchant cannot withdraw or spend any of the funds in their
account. This will result in the loss of funds in these accounts at the time of freezing
and potentially additional losses due to opportunity cost while establishing a new
account. In addition, PayPal performed their own investigation to identify addi-
tional booter domains and limited accounts linked to these domains as well. This
had the affect of a large-scale PayPal payment disruption for the majority of booter
services.
In order to further understand the effectiveness of our payment intervention,
we monitored underground forums where these booters advertise their services and
news feeds from booters we joined to discover qualitative data on the effectiveness
of PayPal’s payment intervention.
5.6.2 Usage Pattern of PayPal Accounts
Based on our observations, booter services will generally use only one PayPal
account at a time to receive payments. Once a limit is put on an account, they will
change it. At times, they will also proactively change accounts to reduce the risk of
having limits imposed. We used the dataset collected during the initial monitoring
period to understand how frequently booter services were changing their PayPal
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Booter accounts before accounts after Status
ANO ? 6 (8.2) 7 (2.9) 3
AUR 6 (7.2) 6 (2.7) 7
BOO • 6 (8.3) 11 (2.7) 3
CRI † 4 (9.0) 1 (2.0) 7
DAR  4 (6.0) 5 (4.8) 3
DIA † 3 (15.7) 0 (-) 7
GET 2 (14.0) 1 (4.0) 3
GRI ? 4 (10.5) 1 (6.0) 3
HAZ  4 (12.2) 5 (5.6) 3
IDD  3 (7.7) 2 (9.0) 3
IPS  3 (7.3) 5 (5.4) 3
POW 5 (4.5) 9 (5.0) 3
PRI 6 (8.8) 2 (1.0) 7
QUA 11 (4.3) 22 (1.8) 3
RAG • 13 (3.9) 4 (2.0) 3
REB 2 (11.5) 9 (2.3) 7
RES ? 6 (8.2) 7 (2.9) 3
SNO 1 (-) 0 (-) 7
STA 5 (13.0) 3 (5.3) 3
STR 1 (47.0) 1 (4.0) 3
TIT  12 (5.3) 17 (2.9) 3
XR8 4 (10.5) 11 (1.6) 3
XRS • 8 (5.2) 4 (2.5) 7
119 (7.84) 133 (3.07)
Table 5.7: Number of PayPal accounts used by monitored booters before
and after the intervention. The numbers within the () are the average lifespan
(in days) of the accounts used by that booter. Accounts that are active both before
and after are counted only in the before and not included when computing the
average lifespan. Matching symbols indicate that this set of booters shared at least
one PayPal account. These shared accounts might be instances of a third party
agreeing to accept payments for these services.
accounts. Note that our age measures are both right and left-censored. For the
booter’s initial account our data is left-censored and for the last account our data
is right-censored. However, we believe our age measurements accurately represent
the effects of the PayPal intervention based on our interactions with and postings
from the booters themselves.
Table 5.7 provides an overview of the PayPal accounts observed by our crawler
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Figure 5.3: PayPal account usage over time. Black asterisks denote a new
PayPal account and gaps in the blue line represent PayPal unavailability for that
time period. The red vertical line indicates when the reporting of accounts started.
broken down by each service monitored. As Table 5.7 shows, accounts had an aver-
age lifespan of slightly over a week before the intervention with STR and SNO using
a single account that remained active during the entire 47-day initial observation
period and SNO’s account remaining active for 37 days after the intervention began.
On the other end of the spectrum, QUA, RAG and TIT changed accounts every 4-5
days before the intervention. The impact of the intervention can be visually seen in
Figure 5.3.
Once the target intervention begins the average lifespan of an account drops
to around 3.5 days with many booter’s PayPal accounts only averaging around two
days before they are no longer used again. Figure 5.3 visually shows the impact of
the payment intervention on the lifespan of booter’s PayPal accounts and provides
some indication of the time period that elapsed between a new PayPal account
being actively used to accept payments and it ended either due to PayPal action
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or a booter’s proactive replacement. The length and number of PayPal outages
increase after the intervention, with only QUA and TIT avoiding major PayPal
outages by resorting to aggressively replacing accounts. Note that this replacement
strategy was not fully effective, since our monitoring infrastructure detected and
reported these accounts.
We use the Kaplan-Meier estimator to compare the lifespan of PayPal accounts
before and after the intervention. The lifespan duration of an account is defined as
the time difference in days between the first usage of the account and its last date of
usage. The accounts that were first seen before the intervention date and were still
in active use on the intervention date are labeled as censored. The same applies to
the accounts used by booter services in the time period after the intervention and
still in active use at the end of the data collection period (07/24).
Figure 5.4 shows that the lifespan decreased after the intervention. The shaded
areas represent the 95% confidence bounds. The result of a log-rank test with 99%
confidence limits indicates a significant difference between the two survival curves.
5.6.3 Booters’ Status
As part of our daily monitoring of the 23 booter services, we recorded if the
service could accept PayPal payments and if the site was functional. This enabled us
to better understand the impact of the payment intervention on the booter’s ability
to accept PayPal payments and operate the booter. Each booter was categorized
by one of the following statuses each day, based on the results of our crawl.
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Figure 5.4: Lifespans of PayPal accounts before and after the intervention.
Active: The booter is able to successfully use a PayPal account to receive payments
from its customers.
Unreachable/Broken: Either the booter’s frontend website was not responding to
HTTP requests, the booter service had closed or the frontend site was not functional.
PayPal Disabled: The booter’s frontend website is active, but the service has
either removed PayPal as a payment option, or the PayPal account linked to the
booter website is limited and therefore unable to receive payments.
Figure 5.5 shows the status of booter services over time. The vertical line
represents the date on which we started sharing our data with PayPal and PayPal
started to independently investigate the reported accounts and take action against
them. As observed in Figure 5.5, the percentage of active booters quickly drops
from 70-80% to around 50% within a day or two following the intervention date
and continues to decrease to a low of around 10%, before fluctuating between 10-
30%. This resulted in an increase in PayPal unavailability from 20% before the
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Figure 5.5: Status of booters over time.
intervention to 63% during the intervention. In addition, we observed 7 booter
services in our study shut down their businesses and most of the remaining services
switched to alternative payment methods, such as Bitcoin.
5.6.4 Qualitative Assessments
In addition to our quantitative measurements, we also have qualitative evi-
dence of the efficacy of PayPal’s payment intervention. By monitoring the under-
ground forums where these services advertise we can witness the impact of these
account limitations. Wrote one booter operator during the intervention, “So until
now 5 time my 5 PayPal Accounts got Limited on My stresser is other stresser have
same Problem with the f***ing Paypal ? is there any solution what we should do
about f***ing Paypal ?” Similarly, customers vented their frustration at being un-
able to purchase a booter service using PayPal. Wrote one booter customer, “when i
go to buy a booter it normally says i can’t buy because their PayPal has a problem.”
In a number of cases, booters directly link their closures to loss of funds due
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to PayPal merchant account limitations. This message was posted on the front page
of a defunct booter service, “It’s a shame PayPal had to shut us down several times
causing us to take money out of our own pocket to purchase servers, hosting, and
more.”
5.6.5 Booter Response
As with any intervention, the target, in our study booters, will respond by
adapting to the pressure. In this case, we do not have enough quantitative mea-
surements to assess the effectiveness or the full range of responses to our attempt
to undermine booter’s payment infrastructure. However, we have identified several
common classes of adaptations in response to the intervention.
Alternate payment methods. Most booters have added Bitcoin as an alternate
payment method and have posted links to services that allow customers to purchase
bitcoins using credit cards or PayPal. In addition to bitcoins some switched to
Google Wallet and others added the option to pay using virtual currencies, such
as Webmoney and Perfect Money. By all accounts, these have resulted in reduced
customer bases unless the booter can directly accept credit card payments. Evi-
denced by the fact that many booters continued to replace their PayPal accounts
even when previous ones were limited and their funds were lost. Assuming that
alternative payment methods did not result in reduced revenue or higher costs there
would be little incentive to continue using risky payment methods, such as PayPal.
Referrer anonymizing services. We have noticed that some booters have stopped
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directly linking to PayPal and are now linking to an intermediary site and then redi-
recting the customer from this intermediary domain to PayPal’s site. This interme-
diary redirection site is used to hide the booter’s real domain name in the referrer
field from PayPal. A subset of booters have also started to replace this intermedi-
ary domain every time they replace a PayPal account. The effect of this is that it
requires active crawling and measurements of booter sites to identify a new PayPal
account. This bypasses passive methods PayPal could use to linking accounts, such
as by using referrers, which results in increasing the difficulty of monitoring booter’s
PayPal accounts and effort required to investigate these accounts.
Offline payment. Finally, in some cases booters have required customers to open
a ticket to pay using PayPal. This method increases the effort to monitor the
booter for new accounts, since instead of an automated crawler someone must now
interact with the booter service manually. However, this method also requires the
booter service to manually activate each account and drives away customers that
are seeking automated subscription purchasing systems.
5.7 Discussion and Future Work
We have gathered a few key points from ours and the community’s efforts to
understand and undermine these DDoS services. Most of these potential strategies
involve driving up costs of operating booter services and reducing the convenience
of subscribing.
Reducing scale and accessibility. Limiting access to convenient payment meth-
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ods, such as PayPal, had an impact on the scale of booter services based on our
quantitative and qualitative analysis. This also results in a financial loss to the
cybercriminals since they cannot withdraw the funds in their limited accounts at
least during a certain amount until PayPal completes an internal investigation on
the limited accounts.
In addition, disabling PayPal payment system of booter services may be able
to result in reduced accessibility to the booter services. Our analysis of the revenue
generated via PayPal and other payment methods (e.g., Bitcoin and MoneyBookers)
implies that the customers of the booter services prefer PayPal. Hence, the inter-
vention on PayPal payment system of the booter services would result in limited
accessibility to their services.
However, based on the short duration of the intervention it is unclear if this
approach would continue to be effective in the longer-term. As future work, we plan
to understand how to improve the effectiveness of these interventions and make them
sustainable. This in part requires developing more robust monitoring tools that
better mitigate countermeasures being deployed to make their payment methods
more robust to interventions.
Reducing effectiveness of attacks. We plan to continue our monitoring efforts
of the amplification servers used by booters and begin sharing this information with
existing patching efforts, such as the OpenResolverProject [70] and OpenNTPPro-
ject [71]. Along with this, we plan to experiment with active notifications sent to
the ISP and abuse contact for the server. There is some indications that active no-
tification improves patching rates in context of patching vulnerable services [72,73].
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Increasing costs. This might be achieved with an increased effort to locate and
blacklist or de-peer low-cost hosting services that cater to DDoS attacks by providing
the ability to spoof and unlimited bandwidth. This might force these services to
pay a premium for bullet-proof hosting attack servers, which would result in reduced
profitability or be passed along to subscribers in the form of increased subscription
costs.
In addition, convincing CloudFlare and other free anti-DDoS services to pro-
hibit these booter services would increase their costs by forcing them to build and
pay for anti-DDoS services that cater to these abusive booters. Admittedly these
suggestions will likely not result in large cost increases unless tremendous amounts
of pressure were placed on these parts of their infrastructure.
Increasing risk to operators. Our analysis of data provided by PayPal suggests
that much of this activity is occurring in the United States. If this is the case
there is the potential that increased law enforcement efforts could have a direct
impact in arresting key operators of these services and increasing the perceived risk
of operating and using these services. In the case of operators it is likely they could
be replaced by overseas operators. However, in the case of customers it might be
difficult to find a new subscriber based for these services that is located outside
the United States and Western Europe if the perceived risk of using these services
increased. To this end we plan to work with law enforcement to understand how
effective this type of intervention is on mitigating the threat of booter services.
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5.8 Conclusion
Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that will mitigate the threat posed by
booter services overnight. These booters have grown in scale due to the perceived
low-risk nature, their profitability and increasing demand for DDoS attacks.
In this chapter we have mapped out a range of support infrastructure that
booters depend on in terms of advertising, attack, hosting and payment. We demon-
strated that payment interventions, which undermine the accessibility of convenient
payment methods, such as PayPal, can potentially have an impact on reducing the
scale of these services. Our hope is that by continuing to explore new methods
for understanding and undermining booters, we can identify increasingly effective
methods of adding friction, cost and risk to these ventures that further erodes their
scale and profitability over time.
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Appendix A: Scam Examples
A.1 Example fake payment scam emails
Frequently Observed Emails
[Body:] HELLO..IS THE ITEM HELLO, IS THE ITEM POSTED ON CL LISTED ABOVE
STILL FOR SALE?? KINDLY GET BACK TO ME WITH THE LAST PRICE AND PRESENT
CONDITION.THANKS
# Times observed: 295
[Body:] HELLO, IS THE ITEM POSTED ON CL LISTED ABOVE STILL FOR SALE??
# Times observed: 293
[Body:] Is it still available?
# Times observed: 182
[Body:] Good day as i come across your listing on craigslist and i would like
to know if its still for sale.
# Times observed: 180




- [words omitted] Please respond to this mail before the penalty decision is
taken against you. You are warned. We are waiting for your mail before we can
credit your account and this is due to the large increase in the rate of the
online scams recorded in the previous years. [words omitted]
- [words omitted] i think if i did not hear back from you within next 24hrs
iwill have to contact FBI about your actions on Craigslist.org [words omitted]
- [words omitted] i will report you to paypal an FBI i give you 12h to get it
ship [words omitted]
- Hey man what is going on i getting the FBI involve in this; is getting
irritating [words omitted]
Figure A.2: Sample emails with belligerent tones. After making fake PayPal pay-
ment, scammers urge the victim to send the goods immediately. Note that some sentences
are omitted for brevity or to remove personally identifiable information.
Broken Subject & Body
[Subject:] <span class=i h data-id=0:00x0x 6FPl-
zGRnuHX> </span>
[Body:] Is your <span class="i h" data-id=
"0:00x0x 6FPlzGRnuHX"></span> still available for sale??
i will reply right away. Thanks
Sent from Devon’s IPhone




<body>still for sale?; feel free to email me at darrenamos69@gmail.com
</body></html>
Figure A.3: Sample broken subject and body lines. Similar broken subjects were




[Body:] I’m interested in buying the posted item & your price Get back to me
with your email welchcarrie619@gmail.com
Date/Times: 6/23/2013 3:04 - 4:47 PM
# Times observed: 36
[Body:] I’m interested in buying the posted item & your price Get back to me
with your email sanjossmith@gmail.com
Date/Times: 6/29/2013 2:08 - 3:57 PM
# Times observed: 14
[Body:] I’m interested in buying the posted item & your price Get back to me
with your email robert.waddick@gmail.com
Date/Times: 6/30/2013 3:56 - 6:04 PM
# Times observed: 19
Figure A.4: Sample recurring emails bursts. Bursts of emails are frequently observed.
This observation also implies scammers might be using the automated tools.
Curses Indicating Manual Operation
- [curse word omitted] you stupid scammer. [words omitted]
- ARE YOU TRYING TO SCAM ME OR WHAT?
- WTF are you sending to me again ? i have already transfer the money into
your PayPal Account and the money has already been deducted from my account;get
the iphone 5 ship out via usps express mail and get back to me with the
tracking number immediately you shipped. [words omitted]
Figure A.5: Sample emails indicating manual operation. In some cases, scammers
detected us and sent this kind of curses in second responses.
Invoking God for Sincerity/Empathy
- [words omitted] I need you to be honest with the sale as I am a God fearing
person. [words omitted]
- [words omitted] Note: I will be paying you extra money to cover the shipping
cost through USPS EXPRESS MAIL. Also i wanted you to consider this sold to me
and please remove the post from the craigslist site.Thank you and God Bless
[words omitted]
- Do you still have this item for sale? GOD BLESS AMERICA.......................
- [words omitted] God bless as you do ship and i hope to do more business with
you. [words omitted]
Figure A.6: Sample emails invoking God.
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Capitalized Text
- LET ME KNOW IF THE ITEM STILL AVAILABLE FOR SALE.
- HELLO..IS THE ITEM HELLO, IS THE ITEM POSTED ON CL LISTED ABOVE STILL FOR
SALE?? KINDLY GET BACK TO ME WITH THE LAST PRICE AND PRESENT CONDITION.THANKS
Figure A.7: Sample emails with CAPITALIZED text.
Recurring Themes in Emails
Military member unable to come view product
- [words omitted] My mode of payment would be in CERTIFIED CHECK and i will
arrange for a local pick up as soon as you get the check; because that is
the only convenient means for me and due to my work frame i can not be able
to get there and i promise everything will go smoothly.I really wish to be
there to check out the item but i don’t have chance cause am very busy person
(US MARINE). And am already back to camp but i will get home very soon [words
omitted]
- [words omitted] i have no problem with the amount as am a US marine i work
for the United State Marine Corps (USMC) but am currently hospitalized so am on
a treatment in New york [words omitted]
- [words omitted] Am willing to buy and am a serious buyer but am not around
now so i won’t be able to come to have a look because am in camp now I’m a
Marine(US MARINE).payment will be done by BANK CERTIFIED CHECK [words omitted]
Present for family member and buyer overseas
- [words omitted] i want you to know you are also in safe hands and i want
you to assure me that i won’t be disappointed with it cos am getting it for
my cousin the issue is that am not around i would have come and see it [words
omitted]
- [words omitted] i wanted to buy this for my Cousin; but the issue is am
currently out of state on a Contract Project .The contract is strictly no call
due to the lack of reception in the area. [words omitted]
- [words omitted] im arranging it for my cousing birthday who live in OKLAHOMA
USA.im off shore and Right now the only way i can make the payment is via
paypal as i don’t have access to my bank account online and theres no way i
can issue out a check or something here [words omitted]
Figure A.8: Sample themes in emails. Usually observed in second or later responses.
Conversation leads to fraud attempt through fake PayPal payment or bogus check.
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A.2 Example rental scam ads
*Come See this stunning 2 bedroom 2.5 bathroom home*
Come See this quiet 3 bedroom 2 bathroom rental property* 2014 Deal
Come See this lovely 1 bed / 1.5 bath rental* Discount for 2014
Come Lay your eyes upon this wonderful 2 bedroom 1.5 bathroom property*
Come Lay your eyes upon this gorgeous 1 bed 1 bath place*
Come Lay your eyes upon this gorgeous 1 bed / 1.5 bath rental*
Figure A.9: Example ad titles with sophisticated templates used by CreditRe-
port Yahoo campaign.
Figure A.10: Example rental clone scam ad. Left figure is an original legitimate ad
posted on Redfin.com for sale. Right figure is a clone scam ad with extremely low rent
price, $ 800.
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A.3 Example rental scam emails
Good Morning,
How are you doing? I had to leave Bloomington, MN in a hurry due to my recent
promotion and it involves me working in different states.
...
I am currently working as a counselor for the United States Aid for
International Development (US-AID) here in Salinas, CA. Please visit
http://www.usaid.gov/, you can also support our mission.
...
The rent is $600 while the security deposit is also $600. The house is ready
for move in..UTILITIES INCLUDED AND LEASE IS 6 MONTHS TO A YEAR..
...
(a) Example scam email received from KenStaley campaign. (User scam report)
Good evening,
How are you and your family? I really hope i am not getting back to you very
late about the house you want to rent, I had to leave Houston, TX in a hurry
due to my recent promotion and it involves me working out of the Houston, TX.
...
I am currently working as a counselor for the United States Aid
for International Development (US-AID) here in AL. Please visit
http://www.usaid.gov/, you can also support our mission.
...
The rent is $600 while the security deposit is also $600. The house is ready
for move in.. YES UTILITIES INCLUDED AND LEASE IS 6 MONTHS TO A YEAR WITH
OPTION OF LEASE TO OWN..
...
(b) Example scam email receivend from a clone scam campaign.
Figure A.11: Example rental scam emails.
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PLEASE TELL US ABOUT YOURSELF
Full Name
Home Phone ( )




Reasons for Leaving Rent $
Are you married
How many people will be living in the house
Do you smoke
Do you have a pet
Do you have a car
Occupation
Move In Date
How soon can you make the payment
How soon do you want to receive the keys and the document
Figure A.12: Example rent application template. Clone scam campaigns usually
request a victim to fill out their rent application form.
Hello,
I hope you are having a wonderful day. Here’s some good news: the apartment’s
still available!
...
When you’re ready for a personal appointment, then please go to the link
below and grab your free credit score. We recommend this site because all
of our tenants used it and never had any problems. Just fill out the form and
indicate that you want the score. What is in the report isn’t important to us,
it’s more of a formality to have it on file, to make sure there are no previous
property related issues. You can get your free credit score at CLICK HERE
Remember, we only need to see the page about the rental history. That’s all
we need to see at the showing. We typically waive the security deposit with a
score of 560+.
...
Figure A.13: Example credit report scam email.
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A.4 Misc.
Figure A.14: Craigslist phone verification scam. The web page shows the Craigslist’s
original phone verification web page to victims. The victims unintentionally help the
scammer get phone-verified Craigslist accounts.
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